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WOKE CAPITAL:
THE ROLE OF CORPORATIONS
IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
JENNIFER S. FAN*
Iconic companies such as Apple, BlackRock, Delta, Google (now Alphabet),
Lyft, Salesforce, and Starbucks, have recently taken very public stances on vari-
ous social issues. In the past, corporations were largely silent in the face of
them. Now the opposite is true—corporations play an increasingly visible role
in social movements and there are times when corporations have led the discus-
sion, particularly in areas where they have a self-interest or public opinion sup-
ports it. The enormous influence corporations wield on both the economic and
social fabric of our society due to the legal framework and norms under which
they operate make them uniquely positioned to affect the outcome of social
movements—for better or worse. The contribution of this Article is three-fold: it
discusses how court cases and changing norms about the role of the corporation
in society led to the rise of the modern business corporation, which in turn laid
the groundwork for corporations’ involvement in social movements; provides an
original descriptive account of the role of corporations in social movements us-
ing three case studies and the ways in which corporations have helped or hin-
dered such movements; and tackles the underlying normative question about the
appropriateness of the involvement of corporations in social movements in light
of the legal framework in which it resides. This Article concludes that despite the
perils, corporate law holds the promise of being a force for social change.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 14, 2018, a former student at Marjory Stoneman Douglas
High School killed seventeen people with an AR-15 assault rifle. In the af-
termath of prior school shootings, the media frenzy tapered off after the
initial uproar;1 there was no passage of meaningful gun reform legislation;2
and the communities affected by these tragedies would quietly soldier on
and try to put the pieces back together.3 And, for-profit corporations did not
make their viewpoints known.4 This time, it was different. Media coverage
continued, students mobilized, and communities let their outrage be known.5
Even corporations across many different industries reacted swiftly,6 some-
times to the detriment of the corporation itself.7 In many ways, the willing-
1 See Rick Hampson, Gun Control Momentum ‘Didn’t Happen Out of the Blue’: Why
Parkland’s Different, USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2018/03/07/gun-control-momentum-didnt-happen-out-blue-why-parklands-different/401
312002/.
2 See Editorial Board, How Congress Has Dithered as the Innocent Get Shot, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/15/opinion/congress-gun-pro-
gress.html.
3 See Jonah Engel Bromwich, ‘Something About Parkland Has Been Different’: Survivors
From 20 Years of Mass Shootings Speak, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/03/23/us/mass-shooting-survivors-march-lives-.html.
4 See generally Melissa Jeltsen, Public Outrage Over Mass Shootings Is Running On
Empty, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
public-outrage-mass-shootings_us_5a70dbf6e4b0a6aa487424be. This article was published
only two weeks before the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Id.
5 See Hadas Gold, The Persistence of Parkland: How the Florida Shooting Stayed in the
Media Spotlight, CNN MONEY (Feb. 22, 2018, 10:47 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/22/
media/parkland-florida-shooting-media-coverage/index.html.
6 Among the companies that spoke out or changed their policies after the Parkland shoot-
ing were: Aetna, Avis, Budget, Black Rock, Bumble, Delta Airlines, Dick’s Sporting Goods,
Enterprise Holdings, First National Bank of Omaha, Gucci, Hertz, Kroger, L.L.Bean, Lockton,
Lyft, MetLife, Paramount RX, REI, SimpliSafe, Starkey, Symantec, True Car, United Airlines,
Walmart. See Students of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, ‘Please Help Us’: A Letter
to the Business Community from the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Survivors, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 11, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/parkland-survivors-ask-busi
nesses-to-support-march-for-our-lives-2018-3.
7 For example, Delta was threatened with the loss of a lucrative tax break in Georgia
almost immediately after it announced its plan to stop offering discounted fares to National
Rifle Association (NRA) members. Marwa Eltagouri, A Georgia Republican’s Threat to Delta:
Restore NRA Benefits, or You Won’t Get Your Tax Break, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018), https://
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\9-2\HLB203.txt unknown Seq: 3 16-DEC-19 10:53
2019] Woke Capital: The Role of Corporations in Social Movements 443
ness of corporations to take a stand was remarkable as corporations typically
choose to remain out of the fray of social issues, fearing consumer backlash.
Indeed, on most social issues, corporations have historically been reluctant
to speak out; they are more likely to speak out when economic issues are at
stake.8 Today, the economic might of a number of corporations now rivals
that of national economies and gives them increased political power as a
result.9 “While corporations have a vested interest in influencing their insti-
tutional environment . . . not all the issues firms engage in are clearly salient
to their overall objectives. In fact, some firms have, in recent times, engaged
in sociopolitical issues that are divisive, unsettled, emotionally charged, or
contested.”10 In the United States, the rise of corporations has come against
the backdrop of government receding, increasingly partisan politics, and an
ever-widening divide between rich and poor. As a society, we grapple with
how innovations like social media and artificial intelligence have fundamen-
tally altered the fabric of our society and how we communicate and process
information. We have entered a new age—the age of the Information Tech-
nology Revolution11—and corporations are at the center of it.
Historically, corporations were derided as a source of “evil”12 and “a
vehicle for the voices and interests of an exceedingly small managerial and
financial elite—the notorious [one] percent”;13 they are synonymous with
the status quo. As this Article will show, however, the role of corporations
and the corporate law framework in which it resides is not so black and
white. Corporations can and have played significant roles in social move-
www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/02/26/georgia-republicans-threat-to-delta-
stop-boycotting-the-nra-or-lose-your-tax-breaks/. The Georgia legislature swiftly followed
through on their threat when Delta did not reinstate the NRA discount. Marwa Eltagouri,
Georgia Republicans Honor Their Threat to Punish Delta for Cutting Ties with NRA, WASH.
POST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/03/01/georgia-
republicans-honor-their-threat-to-harm-delta-in-defense-of-the-nra/?utm_term
=.5b06730f6f0c.
8 “Traditionally, corporations aimed to be scrupulously neutral on social issues. No one
doubted that corporations exercised power, but it was over bread-and-butter economic issues
like trade and taxes, not social issues. There seemed little to be gained by activism on poten-
tially divisive issues, particularly for consumer brands.” Jerry Davis, What’s Driving Corpo-
rate Activism, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 27, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/137252/whats-
driving-corporate-activism.
9 Michael Nalick, Matthew Josefy, Asghar Zardkoohi & Leonard Bierman, Corporate So-
ciopolitical Involvement: A Reflection of Whose Preferences?, 30 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 384,
384 (2016).
10 Id.
11 See Matthew Bey, The Tech Revolution Comes of Age, STRATFOR (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tech-revolution-comes-age.
12 Angela Allan, How the ‘Evil Corporation’ Became a Pop-Culture Trope, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/evil-corporation-trope/
479295/.
13 Kent Greenfield, Can Corporations Be Good Citizens?, SYMPOSIUM MAG. (Nov. 3,
2013), http://www.symposium-magazine.com/can-corporations-be-good-citizens/.
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ments.14 Whether they can and should under the existing legal framework is
a question this Article will begin to explore.
The relationship between social movements and the law has generally
focused on constitutional theory and lawyering theory.15 This Article offers a
different viewpoint by examining social movements through the lens of cor-
porate law. It begins by analyzing whether the involvement of corporations
in social movements fits within existing corporate law doctrine. It then puts
forth a normative vision of the relationship between social movements and
corporate law scholarship, and offers an interpretive theory of the role of
corporations in both advancing and impeding social movements through
overt and covert actions (as well as inaction).
While litigation has traditionally served as one of the most widely used
tactics for change in social movements, now corporations provide another
avenue to address social issues. However, whether corporations help or hin-
der the goals of social movements remains to be seen and will be discussed
in greater detail below.
The evolving role of the corporation, the advent of social media, and
the effect of shareholders, managers, and consumers on businesses have
pushed corporations to become leaders on social issues and influencers in
social movements in particular. “Information about companies and their pol-
icies is increasingly transparent. Customers can now use the Buycott app to
scan bar codes and determine if the product they are considering buying
aligns with their values, from labor practices to whether it contains
GMOs.”16 In considering whether and to what extent corporations should be
involved in social movements, this Article will consider the confluence of
factors that led to this juncture and why now might be a defining moment for
corporations.
To frame the ensuing analysis, the Article proceeds in three parts. Part I
discusses the scholarship on corporate purpose and law and social norms as
well as court cases that influenced the contours of corporate law. Specifi-
cally, this Part shows how the laws under which corporations operate in the
14 A social movement can be defined as a “loosely organized but sustained campaign in
support of a social goal, typically either the implementation or the prevention of a change in
society’s structures or values.” Ralph H. Turner, Lewis M. Killian & Neil J. Smelser, Social
Movement, ENCYCLOPæDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-movement
(last visited Dec. 31, 2018).
15 See Scott L. Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 64
UCLA L. REV. 1554 (2017) (citing Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1501–11 (2005)); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 419, 419–20 (2001); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict
and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1364
(2006)); see also Mary Ziegler, Framing Change: Cause Lawyering, Constitutional Decisions,
and Social Change, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 263, 280–84 (2010).
16 Gerald F. Davis & Christopher J. White, The New Face of Corporate Activism, STAN.
SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Fall 2015), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_new_face_of_corporate_
activism.
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United States have evolved and laid the groundwork for corporations to be-
come more influential over time. It then illustrates that changes in the
workforce and the increasing power of consumers and executives has
spurred corporations to take a more active role in social issues and in social
movements generally. Taken together, corporate law and the evolving norms
around the role of corporations form the basis of the legal framework for
whether and when corporations can be involved in social movements. Part II
then analyzes three case studies from different social movements, showing
the range of responses by corporations, their positive and negative attributes,
and ways in which the responses of corporations to social movements both
helped and hindered. In particular, this Part uses framing analysis which
originates from social movement theory to examine the effectiveness of the
corporation within the particular social movement. Part III discusses the nor-
mative implications of having corporate law influence social movements and
offers guiding principles on what corporations should consider when in-
volved with such movements. This Article concludes that despite the perils
associated with the involvement of corporate law within social movements,
there is the promise of meaningful change.
I. THE EVOLVING CORPORATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
A. Corporate Purpose
Since the early days of America, the role and view of corporations have
changed considerably.17 Chief Justice Marshall described a corporation as
“an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law.”18 Corporations have also been characterized as “purely legal crea-
tures, without flesh, blood, or bone. Their existence and behavior is  deter-
mined by a web of legal rules found in corporate charters and bylaws, state
corporate case law and statutes, private contracts, and a host of federal and
state regulations.”19 By the mid-nineteenth century, “the corporate charter
had evolved into a readily accessible instrument for a vibrant entrepreneurial
society”—the “essential handmaiden of economic growth.”20 When viewing
17 For an overview of role and view of corporations in early America and the nineteenth
century, see Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
1629 (2011). Corporations have affected society in both small and large ways since the time of
the slave trade. 15 Major Corporations You Never Knew Profited from Slavery, ATLANTA
BLACK STAR (Aug. 26, 2013), http://atlantablackstar.com/2013/08/26/17-major-companies-
never-knew-benefited-slavery/.
18 Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
19 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
163, 176 (2008). Indeed, “[c]orporations to a considerable degree are legal creatures, and it is
the law, more than politics or government, that seems best able to trace the bounds between
their private rights and public responsibilities.” Morton Keller, The Making of the Modern
Corporation, in CORPORATE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (Joseph Sora ed., 1998).
20 Keller, supra note 19, at 7. R
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corporations through the lens of corporate constitutional rights jurispru-
dence, the United States Supreme Court (the Court) characterized corpora-
tions as associations of individuals.21 As two corporate law scholars assert,
however, the Court’s view of corporations worked until the late nineteenth
century when American businesses experienced a dramatic transformation.22
“[Corporations] were taking on identities—often tied to brands—that were
truly separate from any of their individual investors, directors, or managers
. . . .”23 The corporate form evolved and began being used for cooperatives,
clubs, advocacy associations, nonprofits, and the like.24 Then came the rise
of the modern business corporations where the Court “recognized protec-
tions for commercial speech, corporate political spending, and statutory pro-
tection for religious free exercise.”25 For example, in 2010, Citizens United
v. FEC26 upended the notion of corporations; corporations were now con-
ferred with “personhood.”27 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that
the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting independent
political expenditures by corporations and unions.28 This ruling had vocal
supporters and opponents and led to calls to amend the U.S. Constitution,29
cries for congressional fixes,30 and much academic31 and public commen-
tary.32 More recently, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court held
21 See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Con-
stitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2015).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. “Corporations, as has so often been observed, are social as well as economic institu-
tions, and the attractive power of the corporate culture should not be underestimated.” Keller,
supra note 19, at 13. R
25 Blair & Pollman, supra note 21, at 1679. “[T]he Court consistently treated corporate R
rights as either derivative or instrumental rights.” Id. The conception of corporate rights as
derivative and instrumental “has not taken account of large, modern business corporations that
cannot be seen as representing an association of identifiable people.” Id. at 1742.
26 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
27 558 U.S. 310, 466.
28 558 U.S. 310, 340, 365. “No less striking is the halting and uncertain, slow and limited
record of the state and of public opinion when it comes to subjecting corporations to signifi-
cant government control.” Keller, supra note 19, at 12. R
29 Paul Blumenthal, Citizens United Constitutional Amendment Backed By Vermont Legis-
lature, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2012, 6:31 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/
19/citizens-united-constitutional-amendment-vermont_n_1439002.html.
30 Liz Kennedy & Alex Tausanovitch, Eight Years After Citizens United, It’s Time for Bold
Ways to Fix Democracy, HILL (Jan. 20, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/
369861-eight-years-after-citizens-united-its-time-for-bold-ways-to-fix.
31 See, e.g., Nadia Imtanes, Should Corporations Be Entitled to the Same First Amendment
Protections as People?, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 203 (2012); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Im-
pact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010); Joseph F. Morrissey, A Con-
tractarian Critique of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765 (2013).
32 See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, The Citizens United Disaster That Wasn’t, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
16, 2017, 6:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-citizens-united-disaster-that-wasnt-1508
194581; Ian Vandewalker, The consequences of ‘Citizens United’, MSNBC (Jan. 20, 2014,
7:55 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-consequences-citizens-united; Ellen L. Wein-
traub, Taking on Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
03/30/opinion/taking-n-citizens-united.html.
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that a business does not need to solely pursue a profit as a matter of state
corporate law.33 Based on these two recent Court cases, corporations do have
a legal basis for being vocal on social issues or in social movements since
maximizing shareholder value does not need to be the sole driver of their
actions. As we will see in the discussion that follows regarding different
theories on corporate purpose, corporations can find support for their in-
volvement in social movements under certain theories as well.34
Historically, the shareholder primacy theory (where the central driver is
making a profit for shareholders) has had many proponents. Conservative
economist Milton Friedman opined that the “one and only one social respon-
sibility of business” is to “use its resources and engage in activities designed
to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game”—that
is, to “make as much money as possible.”35 Corporate managers who shied
away from any social obligations pointed to Friedman’s words as absolving
them of any responsibility to fulfill these types of obligations. Despite the
popularizing of Friedman’s theory, corporations have influenced the path and
outcome of both political and social issues.36
Some legal scholars developed theories aligned with Friedman’s pre-
mise; others approached the corporation from a different lens. What is clear,
however, is that among legal scholars, the debate rages on about the nature
and purpose of the corporation.37 The debate is a complex one with no clear
answers. Legal scholars have offered different theories of the corporation
over time. What follows is a brief overview of the different types of theories
regarding corporations that legal scholars have proposed. Admittedly, the
debate is much more nuanced than how it is portrayed here, but the purpose
is to lay out the competing theories.
33 Justice Alito, writing for the Court, stated that:
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make
money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue
profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corpora-
tions, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is
not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruis-
tic objectives.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). See Lyman Johnson &
David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (2014), for a more in-depth
analysis of the Hobby Lobby case from the state corporate law perspective.
34 “[T]he corporate form has been extraordinarily useful as a way of giving legal (and
public) standing to economic or social ventures.” Keller, supra note 19, at 12. R
35 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Businesses is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970.
36 See Nalick et al., supra note 9, at 384; see also Kabrina Krebel Chang, Starbucks for R
President: The Disappearing Line between Government and Business as Agents for Social
Change, 20 REVISTA EMPRESA Y HUMANISMO 35, 38 (2017).
37 “We are in the midst of a moment of real possibility of rethinking the nature of the
corporation. What are the purposes of corporations? To whom do they owe obligations? Do
they maximize their social value by focusing on economic ends only, or should they be
charged with broader social and political obligations?” Kent Greenfield, Corporate Citizen-
ship: Goal or Fear, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 960, 973 (2013).
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In the past, shareholder primacy was the prevailing theory among cor-
porate scholars.38 Under this view, corporations are viewed as a “nexus” by
which individuals in an enterprise contract with one another.39 In response to
this theory, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout provided a differing
viewpoint on corporations. Based on their framework for corporations, di-
rectors served as mediating hierarchs based on team production theory.40 In
their analysis, directors “are not subject to direct control or supervision by
anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.”41 Professor Stephen Bainbridge
offered another construct of the corporation when he introduced the idea of
director primacy which “claims that shareholders are the appropriate benefi-
ciary of director fiduciary duties . . . . [D]irector accountability for maxi-
mizing shareholder value remains an important component of director
primacy.”42 There is yet another framework by which to look at corpora-
tions: stakeholder theory. Professor Kent Greenfield, one of the architects of
this theory, argues that corporations should act in the interest of all stake-
holders.43 In effect, stakeholder theory “challenge[s] the American corpora-
tion to broaden its role in society and enlarge the obligations it owes beyond
38 In one business article, the authors found that those companies that were most success-
ful at maximizing shareholder value over time did not focus on maximizing shareholder value.
Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsh, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012.
Some scholars cite Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), as evidence
of the shareholder primacy theory. See Kent Greenfield, Corporate Law’s Original Sin, WASH.
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2015, https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/janfeb-2015/sidebar-cor-
porate-laws-original-sin/. But cf. Stout, supra note 19 (arguing that Dodge v. Ford is bad law). R
The case against shareholder primacy was argued best by Steven Pearlstein last year
in the Washington Post. Maximizing shareholder value, he wrote, is a “pernicious”
ideology that “has no foundation in history or in law.” He continued, “What began
in the 1970s and ’80s as a useful corrective to self-satisfied managerial mediocrity
has become a corrupting, self-interested dogma peddled by finance professors,
money managers and over-compensated corporate executives.”
Kent Greenfield, If Corporations Are People, They Should Act Like It, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/if-corporations-are-people-they-
should-act-like-it/385034/ [hereinafter If Corporations are People] (citing Steven Pearlstein,
Putting shareholders first, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2013, at G01).
39 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991).
40 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
41 Id. at 290 (emphasis in original).
42 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 561 (2003).
43 Greenfield, Can Corporations Be Good Citizens?, supra note 13. The stakeholder the- R
ory has been around for decades.
These critics [of the shareholder primacy norm] call on corporations to act as if they
were players not only in the private sphere but in the public one as well. To act, one
might say, as citizens. To call on corporations to act as “good corporate citizens”
means that they should act as if they have broader obligations to the polity and
society that cannot be entirely satisfied by reference to their financial statements.
Id.
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the bottom line. These scholars have assailed the norm of shareholder pri-
macy and called on corporations to recognize and act on the interests of all
stakeholders . . . .”44 The progressive corporate law scholars45 who are pro-
ponents of stakeholder theory argue that this theory “offers the best potential
remedy to the harms of Citizens United—and indeed, the other risks of cor-
porate power we have witnessed in the last few years.”46 This progressive
viewpoint of the corporation falls under the broader idea of demosprudence
championed by Professors Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres.47 “Demos-
prudence . . . is about a practice of law and interpretation of law that in-
creases the quantum of democratic potential in social life.”48 In the case of
the corporation, it is giving a voice to the non-elites. The noticeable dissent
of Alphabet employees through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Google LLC,
(roughly 1,400) to current projects and the effect it is having on Alphabet, is
one example of how the actions of stakeholders (in this case employees)
influence a company.49 It is the stakeholder theory which is in greatest align-
ment with corporations that choose to be involved with social movements.
The conceptions of the role of corporations are ever-changing. Indeed,
the theories described above have evolved and to varying degrees align with
the realities of the world and business practices. As one scholar noted, cor-
porations “that fail to reflect the social values and priorities of their
workforce and their customers are unlikely to thrive.”50
44 Id.
45 “The core tenets of the progressive corporate law movement include the principles that
shareholders are not supreme and that corporations should be measured by more than eco-
nomic measures.” Greenfield, Corporate Citizenship: Goal or Fear, supra note 37, at 970. R
Professor Greenfield suggests a more pluralistic form of decision-making as a way for corpo-
rations to take into account the interests of all stakeholders. For example, he points to Germany
as an example of codetermined board structure that mandates representatives of both share-
holders and employees. Greenfield, If Corporations Are People, supra note 38. R
46 Greenfield, Can Corporations Be Good Citizens?, supra note 13. But cf. D. Gordon R
Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 985, 1010
(2008). Smith contends “that corporate law does not matter in the way [Greenfield] claims
because powerful markets constrain corporate decision making” and if “Greenfield somehow
succeeded in materially changing the content of corporate decisions, he would sacrifice poten-
tial shareholder value in favor of value for non-shareholder constituencies. In the process,
Professor Greenfield’s vision of corporate law would destroy much of the good that corpora-
tions have done.” Id.
47 See generally Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014).
48 Gerald Torres, Legal Change, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 135 (2007).
49 David Meyer, Tesla Probes, Walmart Wins, Nvidia Trips: CEO Daily for August 17,
2018, FORTUNE (Aug. 17, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/08/17/google-china-tesla-sec-
walmart-nvidia-ceo-daily-for-august-17-2018/. The employees argued that they needed “more
transparency, a seat at the table, and a commitment to clear and open processes: Google em-
ployees need to know what we’re building.” Id.
50 Davis & White, supra note 16. Compare this to Warren Buffett, who said: R
I don’t believe in imposing my views on 370,000 employees and a million sharehold-
ers. I’m not their nanny on that . . . . [S]o I think you have to be pretty careful . . . I
think that it’s a mistake to start getting personal views and trying to impose ’em on an
organization.
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From the progressive corporate law standpoint, “[a]s corporations
more deeply embed themselves in the communities they inhabit or affect, the
conception of a corporation as a purely economic actor seems misplaced.”51
In fact, in their seminal work, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means prognosti-
cated that corporations would compete with the government as the dominant
form of social organization.52 As Robert Monks and Nell Minow aptly
pointed out, “[c]orporations do not just determine what goods and services
are available in the marketplace, but, more than any other institution, corpo-
rations determine the quality of the air we breathe and the water we drink,
and even where we live.”53 Monks and Minow go on to state: “Corporations
have a life, and even citizenship, of their own, with attendant right and pow-
ers. Corporations are ‘persons’ within the meaning of the United States Fed-
eral Constitution and Bill of Rights.”54 Not only are corporations the source
of jobs and livelihoods for voters, but they also have a great deal of political
capital which makes corporations particularly influential over legislators
when laws are made.55 Indeed, the pursuit of profit has translated into corpo-
rations cultivating friendly community environments in which they can con-
tinue to thrive.56
The American Law Institute codifies the corporation as an actor in both
the economic and social spheres. It states that a corporation’s objectives are
to enhance corporate profit and shareholder gain, consider ethical questions
so that the corporation can act responsibly, and allocate “a reasonable
amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and phil-
anthropic purposes.”57
Billionaire Investor Warren Buffett Speaks with CNBC’s Becky Quick on “Squawk Box” Today,
CNBC (Feb. 26, 2018) (full transcript), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/26/full-transcript-bil
lionaire-investor-warren-buffett-speaks-with-cnbcs-becky-quick-on-squawk-box-today.html.
51 Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 174 (2010).
52 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 357 (1932).
53 ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9 (5th ed. 2011).
54 Id. at 11.
55 Id.
56 On this topic, Siebecker states that:
Noting the increasing attention corporations pay to societal concerns does not serve
as a rebuke to the basic premise that corporations exist to make profits for sharehold-
ers. But striving for financial gain causes corporations to take a more active role in
securing a commercially friendly social framework that makes profits more likely. In
that sense, modern corporations possess a mutually reinforcing profit motive and
social focus.
Siebecker, supra note 51, at 175. R
57 JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS, ANIL HARGOVAN & MIRKO BAGARIC, PRINCIPLES OF CON-
TEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 301 (2d ed. 2011).
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B. Corporate Law and Social Norms
In addition to the recent court cases described above and stakeholder
theory, corporations can find the legal (or extralegal) basis for their actions
in social movements in the scholarship on corporate law and norms. Profes-
sor Melvin A. Eisenberg argues that directors, officers, and significant share-
holders are not only motivated to avoid liability, but also by the prospect of
financial gain and social norms.58 Professors Edward B. Rock and Michael
L. Wachter built upon this theory and suggest that nonlegal enforceable rules
and standards provide the conduit between the theory of the firm and the law
and norms literature.59 It seems to logically follow then that if the social
expectations for corporations are for them to speak out on social issues then
they should do so. Like social movements,60 corporations can play a critical
“creative role in legal ordering.”61 While social movements can help us bet-
ter understand change in the social, economic, and technological realms, so
can corporations since they are inextricably tied to each of them.62 Also, like
social movements, corporations can provide a construct by which to give
people a sense of purpose to change certain practices and create new
norms.63 We will see this in particular in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans-
gender, and questioning/queer (LGBTQ) case study in Section II.C below.
Finally, just as social movements are important to ensure a continued dy-
namic relation between legal and social institutions to reorient the law to
address evolving social understandings,64 so too can corporations play a role
in this reorientation due to the economic and social clout that they bring.
Historically, social movements take the lead and the courts and lawyers “lag
58 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253,
1253 (1999).
59 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2001).
60 One way to conceptualize social movements is in terms of five key elements:
[F]irst and foremost, they are challengers to or defenders of existing structures or
systems of authority; second, they are collective rather than individual enterprises;
third, they act, in varying degrees, outside existing institutional or organizational
arrangements; fourth, they operate with some degree of organization; and fifth, they
typically do so with some degree of continuity.
DAVID A. SNOW & SARAH A. SOULE, A PRIMER ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 6 (2010). Social
movements are a type of “joint, collective action.” Id. at 15.
61 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 927, 948 (2006). “[M]uch of our nation’s legal history can be described as the
product of social movements . . . . The American Revolution, like many revolutions, was a
classic social movement, and the Boston Tea Party stands as a paradigmatic image of a mobil-
ized, participatory populace.” Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement
Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2001).
62 Balkin & Siegel, supra note 61, at 948. R
63 Id.
64 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\9-2\HLB203.txt unknown Seq: 12 16-DEC-19 10:53
452 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 9
rather than lead”;65 however, in the case of corporations, as illustrated in Part
II, they both lag and lead depending on the context.
C. Corporations Today
Historically, one would not find corporations in the middle of social
movements. Instead, under Milton Friedman’s premise, one “could reasona-
bly assume that government would capably manage social issues, and that
business managers could put a priority on increasing profits.”66 In many
cases, chief executive officers (CEOs) of U.S. corporations have generally
followed Friedman’s advice and devoted themselves to economic issues and
pursuing profit.67 However, government is increasingly gridlocked, mired in
partisan politics, and in some ways hampered by their constituencies and the
desire to be re-elected.68 In fact, in the case studies analyzed in Part II below,
there is a startling lack of leadership from the federal government.69 As a
result of this absence of leadership, corporations have stepped into the void
to address social issues and, in turn, have both voluntarily and forcibly par-
ticipated in social movements.70
In the not-so-recent past, corporations remained silent on social issues.
Now, silence may have negative ramifications.71 There is a societal expecta-
65 Scott Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 360, 363
(2017). In a “new empirically oriented model of law and social change that Cummings calls
movement liberalism[,]” he “explore[s] how movement liberalism has been presented within
legal scholarship as a way of reasserting a politically productive relationship between courts,
lawyers, and social change from the ‘bottom-up.’” Id. at 364.
66 Don Mayer, The Law and Ethics of CEO Social Activism, 23 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 21, 40
(2017).
67 Id. But cf. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, 89 HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan. 2011, at 62–77 (“Businesses must reconnect company success with social
progress.”).
68 E.W., Unprecedentedly Dysfunctional, ECONOMIST (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.econ-
omist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/09/political-gridlock; Dysfunction by Design: Why
American Politics is in Gridlock, CONVERSATION (Apr. 13, 2013), https://theconversation.com/
dysfunction-by-design-why-american-politics-is-in-gridlock-13603.
69 See discussion infra Part II.
70 Activist entrepreneurs were the first “business” activists in the 1960s and 1970s, with
the nonfinancial goal transforming American business through advancing social movements,
creating free spaces for marginalized people, and enhancing democracy in small businesses.
JOSHUA CLARK DAVIS, FROM HEAD SHOPS TO WHOLE FOODS: THE RISE AND FALL OF ACTIVIST
ENTREPRENEURS 19 (2017). Interestingly, a 2018 survey by Weber Shandwick and KRC Re-
search found that in 2018 approximately half of Americans (48%) believe that CEO activism
actually has an influence on government policy. WEBER SHANDWICK & KRC RESEARCH, CEO
ACTIVISM IN 2018: THE PURPOSEFUL CEO 9 (2018), https://www.webershandwick.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/CEO-Activism-2018_Purposeful-CEO.pdf [hereinafter PURPOSEFUL
CEO REPORT].
71 “Now, between the endless, real-time conversation taking place on social media, and
the rising tide of advocacy bubbling up from their own employees, customers, and investors,
saying nothing may be just as dangerous—if not more so.” Sam Walker, You’re a CEO—Stop
Talking Like a Political Activist, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
youre-a-ceostop-talking-like-a-political-activist-1532683844. The overall opinion of CEO ac-
tivism has grown more favorable in recent years, increasing from 31% favorably viewed in
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tion that companies with more than $15 billion in annual revenue will weigh
in on social issues.72 A 2016 study by the Public Affairs Council reported
that “[m]ore than three-quarters of these companies said they experienced
increased pressure to weigh in on social issues.”73 Typically, publicly traded
corporations experienced more pressure than private companies to engage on
various social issues.74 “The poll of 92 businesses in a wide variety of indus-
tries finds that, over the last three years [2013–2016], [sixty] percent have
experienced rising stakeholder pressure to speak out on social issues such as
discrimination, the environment, education and human rights. No respon-
dents reported that pressure had decreased.”75 Those with the most influence
over a corporation’s decision to get involved on a particular issue were se-
nior management and employees.76 Consumers also play a role. Employees
and consumers, particularly millennials, expect and may even demand that
corporate leaders speak up. Entrepreneur-turned-venture-capitalist Marc An-
dreessen observed, “[F]or young companies, everything is connected: stock
price, employee morale, ability to recruit new employees, ability to retain
employees, ability to sign customer contracts, ability to raise debt financing,
ability to deal with regulators.”77 According to recent research, forty-seven
percent of millennials want CEOs to speak out on important issues.78 In fact,
2016 and 2017 to 38% in 2018. PURPOSEFUL CEO REPORT, supra note 70, at 8. However, R
Americans have identified many risks associated with CEOs speaking out on social issues,
such as receiving criticism from customers or employees. Id. at 16. These same risks applied if
the CEO did not speak out as well. Id.
72 Doug Pinkham, Why Companies Are Getting More Engaged on Social Issues, PUB. AFF.
COUNCIL (Aug. 30, 2016), https://pac.org/blog/why-companies-are-getting-more-engaged-on-
social-issues.
73 Id.; see also Taking a Stand: How Corporations Speak Out on Social Issues, PUB. AFF.
COUNCIL (2016), https://pac.org/wp-content/uploads/taking-a-stand.pdf. “Overall, high per-
centages of companies said they have been most involved in recent efforts to protect the envi-
ronment (74%); end discrimination/restrictions based on sexual orientation (59%), gender
(54%), gender identity (52%) or race (50%); improve access to quality education (59%) and
protect human rights abroad (49%).” Pinkham, supra note 72. R
74 Pinkham, supra note 72. R
75 Id.
76 Id. In August 2019, the Business Roundtable, an association of CEOs of America’s
leading companies, released a new statement of corporate purpose which takes stakeholders
into account in a way that it had not done previously. Business Roundtable Redefines the
Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-rede
fines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
77 Gerald Davis, Post-Corporate: The Disappearing Corporation in the New Economy,
THIRD WAY (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.thirdway.org/report/post-corporate-the-disappearing-
corporation-in-the-new-economy.
78 Paul Argenti, When to Say Something: What Companies Need to Know about Engaging
with Political Events and Sensitive Issues, TUCK (Jan. 25, 2018), http://www.tuck.dartmouth
.edu/news/articles/when-corporate-communication-strategy-includes-social-media. Professor
Paul Argenti highlights what corporations should think about when taking a stance on a social
issue: the connection to the company’s values, the risks inherent to the company, and how the
company communicates its message regarding the particular issue. Id. Millennials are ages 18
to 36. WEBER SHANDWICK & KCR RESEARCH, CEO ACTIVISM IN 2017: HIGH NOON IN THE C-
SUITE 3 (July 24, 2017), http://www.webershandwick.com/news/article/ceo-activism-in-2017-
high-noon-in-the-c-suite [hereinafter HIGH NOON]. In 2018, seventy-seven percent of Ameri-
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fifty-six percent of millennials believe that “CEOs and other business lead-
ers have greater responsibility today for speaking out on hotly debated cur-
rent issues than they used to.”79 Corporations understand that their
employees are well aware of their company’s “social value proposition”80
and how that affects them as workers of a company or as consumers of its
goods.81
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, ninety million Ameri-
cans self-identified as “conscious consumers.”82 There is a $3.2 trillion con-
scious consumer market in the United States.83 Over seventy-two percent of
consumers report “that they will actively seek a brand that aligns with their
values if price and quality are equal.”84 In one study, researchers found that
for values-oriented companies greater risk may lie with abstaining from a
stand than taking one; the opposite is true for results-oriented companies.85
“Consumers appear to be forgiving of a company’s different point of view as
long as the motivations behind them are not perceived to be based on
pretense.”86
Corporations come in two varieties: reactive87 and proactive.88 “Neither
type of company is merely paying lip service to social or value-based issues;
they are genuinely investing capital, clout, and reputation in the drive for
cans reported that they believe CEOs need to speak out in defense of their company’s value.
PURPOSEFUL CEO REPORT, supra note 70, at 9. Besides millennials, women and professionals R
in the tech industry (particularly women in the tech industry) are more likely to favor CEOs
speaking out when their company’s values are threatened or on employees’ behalf. Id. at 19;
WEBER SHANDWICK & KRC RESEARCH, CEO ACTIVISM IN 2018: THE TECH EFFECT 13, 21
(2018), https://www.webershandwick.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CEO-Activism-
2018_Tech-Effect.pdf [hereinafter TECH EFFECT]. The view of activism is also divided politi-
cally, with “Democrats [being] significantly more likely than Republicans and Independents
to say companies should take positions. Republicans are significantly more likely to say they
should stick to business.” PURPOSEFUL CEO REPORT, supra note 70, at 15. R
79 HIGH NOON, supra note 78, at 5. By contrast, only twenty-eight percent of Gen Xers R
(ages 37 to 52) and Boomers (ages 53 to 71) “believe CEOs have a responsibility to speak up
about issues that are important to society.” Id.
80 Davis, What’s Driving Corporate Activism, supra note 8. R
81 CEO activism is more likely to increase employees’ loyalty to an organization (31%)
than decrease it (23%). PURPOSEFUL CEO REPORT, supra note 70, at 22. In the tech sector in R
particular, the number who reported CEO activism would increase loyalty was even higher at
seventy-five percent. TECH EFFECT, supra note 78, at 14. R
82 Dante Disparte & Timothy H. Gentry, Corporate Activism is on the Rise, REAL LEAD-
ERS (Oct. 27, 2018), https://real-leaders.com/corporate-activism-rise/.
83 Id.
84 Id. Positive or negative, nearly two-thirds of Americans in 2017 and 2018 took some
kind of action because of a CEO’s stance on a particular issue. PURPOSEFUL CEO REPORT,
supra note 70, at 21. Boycotting was the most common response. Id. R
85 Daniel Korschun, Anubhav Aggarwal, Hoori Rafieian & Scott D. Swain, Taking a
Stand: Consumer Responses When Companies Get (or Don’t Get) Political 20 (Working Paper,
July 9, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2806476.
86 Id.
87 Reactive corporations act in response to a crisis. See Disparte & Gentry, supra note 82. R
88 Proactive corporations take affirmative actions before a crisis occurs. See Disparte &
Gentry, supra note 82 (describing Starbucks, which actively campaigns on emergent social R
issues—even when not in the best interests of its shareholders and economic value—as an
example of a proactive corporation).
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change.”89 Take Starbucks as an example. Under Howard Schultz, Starbucks
“became a paragon of proactive corporate activism, at times to the detriment
of shareholders and short-term economic value.”90 In response to increasing
racial tension in the United States,91 Starbucks undertook its controversial
“Race Together” campaign, which included full-page ads and in-store com-
munication.92 Despite the backlash, it set a “tone at the top” and showed
authenticity.93 “While few people want their barista to talk to them about
race relations, it is of broad public interest when large corporations take a
stance on matters of national import.”94 Starbucks’ proactive stance also al-
igned with its mission statement.95 Mr. Schultz said, “You can’t create emo-
tional attachment if you stand for nothing.”96 What this has meant for
Starbucks and other companies is speaking up on important and sometimes
controversial social and political issues.97
89 Id. “Not every topic is ripe for CEO activism. Americans overall are most likely to say
CEOs and business leaders should express opinions on job and skills training (70%), equal pay
(67%), healthcare coverage (62%) and maternity or paternity leave (61%).” HIGH NOON, supra
note 78, at 11. On other topics, Americans are more divided. For example, with respect to R
gender equality, forty-eight percent say that “leaders should publicly address this issue, while
other issues—those that are arguably politically charged—are not deemed by the average
American as public-platform issues: race relations (37%), climate change (34%), immigration
(32%), LGBT[Q] rights (29%), gun control (26%) and refugees (26%).” Id. In 2018, these
numbers shifted slightly, with Americans identifying the most pressing issues for CEOs’ activ-
ism to be job/skills training (80%), equal pay (79%), and sexual harassment (77%). PUR-
POSEFUL CEO REPORT, supra note 70, at 18. R
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Lauren Fox, National Journal, Obama Confronts Race Relations and Ferguson
in State of the Union Address, ATLANTIC (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2015/01/obama-confronts-race-relations-and-ferguson-in-state-of-the-union-address/
445728/; Timothy Williams & Michael Wines, Shootings Further Divide a National Torn Over
Race, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/shootings-further-
divide-a-nation-torn-over-race.html; Jose A. DelReal, ‘Get ’Em Out!’ Racial Tensions Explode
at Donald Trump’s Rallies, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/get-him-out-racial-tensions-explode-at-donald-trumps-rallies/2016/03/11/b9764884-
e6ee-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html.
92 Disparte & Gentry, supra note 82. R
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Our Mission, STARBUCKS, https://www.starbucks.com/about-us/company-information/
mission-statement (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) (“[W]e live these values: Creating a culture of
warmth and belonging, where everyone is welcome.”).
96 See Chang, supra note 36, at 36; see also id. at 38 (noting that the Mayor of Atlanta R
feared poor turnout for an integrated event celebrating Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Nobel Peace
Prize so he turned to the former CEO of Coca-Cola to convince people to attend the event,
which quickly sold out).
97 Chang notes that:
For Schultz and many other business leaders, the days of strict adherence to Milton
Friedman’s shareholder primacy theory, where a company’s involvement in social
issues is considered theft from shareholders, are numbered. Schultz has made it clear
that the company creates value for its shareholders by living its values in every
transaction, from buying a coffee farm in Costa Rica in order to establish sustainable
farming to serving a customer her grande, non-fat, soy latte. More recently,
Starbucks has voiced its values in areas such as gun control, LGBT[Q] rights, and
race relations.
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As a result of being a first mover in social movements, Starbucks has
become a leader on social issues. “While the rise of corporate activism
speaks to the inherent divisiveness in the American public, many activist
firms are not merely pandering to their base, but rather standing for issues
that are consistent with their company value systems.”98 In political relations
theory, when an organization makes a public statement or takes a public
stance on social political issues it is called corporate social advocacy
(CSA).99 “CSA employs a different strategy, typically involving the CEO or
other executive speaking directly with the public and/or an elected official,
yet it has the potential to influence legislation in the same manner as lobby-
ing.”100 The impact of CSA is such that when a major corporation shares its
thoughts about issues related to diversity and inclusion or guns, “the conver-
sation moves from Washington D.C. to the dinner table.”101 The ability of
CEOs and other leaders to communicate directly to the buying public means
that people pay attention. Mark Benioff, CEO of Salesforce.com (Sales-
force), observed, “it’s not very hard for a CEO like myself or Richard Bran-
son or Michael Dell to tweet something, and one little tweet can make a
huge difference.”102
Id. at 36. In determining when to speak out, “[m]ore than half of communications and market-
ing executives (53%) report their companies spend time discussing whether their CEO should
speak out on hotly debated current issues.” WEBER SHANDWICK & KRC RESEARCH, CEO
ACTIVISM IN 2018: INSIDE COMMS AND MARKETING 7 (2019), https://www.webershandwick
.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CEO-Activism-Inside-Comms-and-Marketing.pdf. The
companies who reported spending time discussing whether CEOs should or should not speak
out reported an overall increase in the amount of time dedicated to this issue in the last couple
years. Id. at 8.
98 Disparte & Gentry, supra note 82. R
99 “Whether these stances are planned, as in the formal output of communication, or not,
as in the case of a CEO making an off-the-cuff remark to a journalist: the outcome is the
perception by the public that the organization is linked in some way with the issue.” Melissa
D. Dodd & Dustin W. Supa, Conceptualizing and Measuring “Corporate Social Advocacy”
Communication: Examining the Impact on Corporate Financial Performance, 8 PUB. REL. J.
at 5 (2014). Furthermore, corporate social advocacy has particular implications if:
(a) the social-political issues addressed by organizations are divorced from issues of
particular relevance to the organization; (b) engagement in the social-political
issues is controversial and serves to potentially isolate organizational stakehold-
ers while simultaneously attracting activist groups; and, (c) as a result, there is a
particularly necessary emphasis on financial outcomes for the organization.
Id. Note that corporate social advocacy differs from corporate social responsibility. Corporate
social responsibility is “a self-regulating business model that helps a company be socially
accountable—to itself, its stakeholders, and the public. By practicing corporate social respon-
sibility, also called corporate citizenship, companies can be conscious of the kind of impact
they are having on all aspects of society including economic, social, and environmental.”
Corporate Social Responsibility, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corp-
social-responsibility.asp (last visited Dec. 31, 2018).
100 Chang, supra note 36, at 37. R
101 Id.
102 Id. “[S]ocial media is a way for social activists to bypass traditional media to create a
stage for themselves in public.” Brayden King & Klaus Weber, Corporate Activism Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow, KELLOGG INSIGHT (Mar. 3, 2014), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern
.edu/article/corporate_activism_yesterday_today_and_tomorrow. Corporations monitor social
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In an era where corporations wield greater political and social power
than ever before, a legal analysis of whether corporations can and should be
involved in social movements is prudent. It is to this endeavor that this Arti-
cle now turns.103
In the case studies that follow in Part II, I will give a more detailed
account about the extent to which corporations shape social movements. As
we will see, there are limits to the reach of corporations within such move-
ments, as well as positive and negative outcomes from their involvement.
II. CASE STUDIES
This Part analyzes the legal and business underpinnings for the role of
corporations in social movements and its broader implications for society as
a whole. Note that I only provide a brief sketch of each of these social move-
ments; a few pages do not do justice to the breadth and depth of each move-
ment. In this Part, I have chosen three case studies to highlight the role (or
absence) of the corporation in a particular moment in time in a social move-
ment and its impact on the law and the corporate form itself. I selected these
particular case studies based on the following criteria: (1) they figure promi-
nently in academic and practitioner circles and have been among the most
divisive social issues of our time; (2) they illustrate both the positive and
negative aspects of corporate involvement in social movements; and (3) they
offer overarching lessons that can inform guidelines for ways in which cor-
porations should and should not be involved in social movements. The case
studies presented illustrate the challenges of sustaining meaningful participa-
tion by corporations in social movements that will bring lasting legal
changes. It also shows the difficulty of working within and outside of ex-
isting legal constructs while simultaneously creating new norms. In the case
studies, I also use frame analysis, described below, to illustrate how individ-
ual actions meld with an organizational structure like corporations.
In the past, the lacunae between legal scholarship and social scientists
may have resided with their different starting points regarding rational actor
theory. Legal scholars accepted Mancur Olson’s premise that there is a col-
lective action problem with rational actors;104 social scientists, in contrast,
believed that individuals were motivated by ideology.105 The social move-
ment literature originates from two different approaches—the American ap-
proach and the Continental one. Inspired by Mancur Olson’s The Logic of
media and connect to activists through these channels; however, these relationships are more
volatile and harder to manage. Id.
103 “[C]orporations should be seen as having robust social and public obligations that
cannot be encapsulated in share prices.” Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30
CONST. COMMENT 309, 328 (2015).
104 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 60–65 (1965); see also SIDNEY
TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICS
13–16 (1994) (illustrating Olson’s influence on American social movement theory).
105 Rubin, supra note 61, at 25. R
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Collective Action, the American approach in social movement literature was
referred to as resource mobilization.106 “Proponents of this approach treat the
members of social movements as instrumentally rational actors, and the
leaders as policy entrepreneurs who follow coherent organizational and po-
litical strategies.”107 The Continental approach believed that the elite used its
influence in the economic sphere to control the political sphere.108 Central to
this viewpoint was the belief that social movements needed “people to gen-
erate new ideologies and re-define their own identities.”109 However, there
were shortcomings to both approaches. In the former, the motivation of the
individuals in the social movement remained unaccounted for and in the
latter, they lacked mechanisms to mobilize those with shared identities into
social action.110 To reconcile the two approaches, Erving Goffman developed
frame analysis.111 In the social movement context, this analysis explains how
shared perceptions by individuals lead to action, thereby putting together
individual motivation and organizational structure.112 Social movement
scholars argue that in order to achieve success, activists should frame issues
to resonate with the identities, ideologies, and cultural understandings of
those who support the movement or potential recruits to it.113 Frames are
“cognitive cues, metaphors, and symbols that showcase issues in a particular
way and suggest possible responses to these issues.”114 They help to “medi-
ate between opportunity structures and action because they provide the
means with which people can interpret the political opportunities before
them and, thus, decide how to best pursue their objectives.”115
In Part II, using frame analysis, I explain how corporations work within
social movements. Unlike individuals, however, corporations already have
an organizational structure which is embedded within the corporation itself.
Other than in the case of filing amicus briefs, it is unclear if corporations
work on their own or in concert with other corporations when they partici-
pate in social movements. It seems that when a number of corporations come
together for a common cause, they have greater influence on the outcome.
As this Part will illustrate, in the context of social movements, corporations
have needed to respond to or undertake a leadership role in certain social
movements because of one or more of the following reasons: (1) it affects
the corporation’s ability to recruit talent; (2) there is a failure of government
106 Id. at 12–13.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 13–14.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 16.
111 Id. at 16–17.
112 Id. at 17.
113 John L. Campbell, Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organizations and
Social Movements Research, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 41, 48 (Ger-
ald F. Davis et al. eds., 2005).
114 Id. at 48–49.
115 Id. at 49.
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or the government has ceded moral authority; or (3) corporations are forced
to act in ways that other actors do not because there is an immediacy to
public demand that they need to contend with that politicians are able to wait
out.
A. Challenging the President: How Corporations Responded
to the Muslim Ban
Before becoming President of the United States, Donald Trump prom-
ised to keep Muslims out of the country. On January 27, 2017, with Execu-
tive Order No. 13769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States,” he tried to make good on that promise.116
Often referred to as the “Muslim Ban,”117 it prevented certain non-citizens
from entering the United States and it also, for a ninety-day period, sus-
pended all citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the
United States.118 Syrian refugees were banned and the annual cap on refugee
admissions was decreased by fifty percent.119 It also created a review system
that preferred Christian refugees living in Muslim-majority countries.120
Stoked by worries of protectionist trade and immigration policies, the market
cap of five of the biggest technology companies went down by $32 billion in
the aftermath of Trump’s executive order.121
Ninety-seven technology companies filed an amicus brief protesting the
Muslim Ban, including Apple, Microsoft, and Netflix.122 Responses from
CEOs ranged from strong to tepid statements.123 Google CEO Sundar Pichai,
an executive officer and director of Alphabet, said, “We’re upset about the
impact of this order and any proposals that could impose restrictions on
116 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
117 See, e.g., Timeline of the Muslim Ban, ACLU WASHINGTON, https://www.aclu-wa.org/
pages/timeline-muslim-ban (last visited Dec. 31, 2018); Aaron Blake, Republicans Insist This
Isn’t a ‘Muslim Ban.’ Trump and Giuliani Aren’t Helping Their Cause at All., WASH. POST (Jan.
1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/30/republicans-insist-
this-isnt-a-muslim-ban-trump-and-giuliani-arent-helping-them-make-that-case/.
118 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978.
119 Id. at 8979; see also Alicia Parlapiano, Haeyoun Park & Sergio Pec¸anha, How Trump’s
Executive Order Will Affect the U.S. Refugee Program, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/25/us/politics/trump-refugee-plan.html.
120 See id.; Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7
Muslim Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/polit-
ics/trump-syrian-refugees.html (noting that Trump admitted in interviews that they were going
to “help” Syrian Christians with the order).
121 Lucinda Shen, The 5 Biggest Tech Companies Lost $32 Billion In Value Over Donald
Trump’s Muslim Ban, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/30/donald-trump-
muslim-ban-tech-companies/.
122 Kate Conger, 97 Companies File Opposition to Trump’s Immigration Order, TECH-
CRUNCH (Feb. 5, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/05/twitter-airbnb-and-others-to-file-
opposition-to-trumps-immigration-order/.
123 Casey Newton, Silicon Valley’s Responses to Trump’s Immigration Executive Orders,
From Strongest to Weakest, VERGE (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/28/1442
6550/silicon-valley-trump-immigration-response.
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Googlers and their families, or that could create barriers to bringing great
talent to the US[.]”124 In the case of Apple, its CEO Tim Cook, said, “This
country is strong because of our immigrant background and our capacity and
ability as a people to welcome people from all kinds of backgrounds. . . .
That’s what makes us special.”125 Although Mr. Cook did not say so at the
time the statement was made, government data revealed that many of Ap-
ple’s best and brightest employees were immigrants that came in through the
H-1 B visa program.126 One survey which tracked corporate responses to the
executive order “found that 84% were issued directly by CEOs and 73%
voiced a clear opinion against the ban. CEOs did not stand on the sidelines
as pressure from stakeholders intensified, demanding greater accountability
from those at the top.”127 Harvard Business School historian Nancy Koehn
said that the corporate response to the travel ban compares to nothing else
“in scale or swiftness.”128 However, for the purposes of this Article, it pro-
vides a helpful example of how corporations may act in the future. One
journalist noted, “It’s no surprise that Silicon Valley would emerge as the
first corporate hub of dissent, considering both the liberal bent of the indus-
try’s workforce and its reliance on foreign-born talent. Less clear is how
many non-tech companies with sprawling global operations will join the
chorus.”129
The corporate response went beyond CEOs’ statements against the
Muslim Ban and amicus briefs; corporations provided other types of re-
sources. Some companies made business and financial commitments.
Starbucks committed to hiring 10,000 refugees.130 Google pledged $4 mil-
lion to help those affected by the Muslim Ban;131 it reported that 187 of its
124 Jack Nicas, Google Criticizes Impact on Staff of Trump Immigration Order, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-criticizes-impact-on-staff-of-trump-im
migration-order-1485596067.
125 Walker, supra note 71. R
126 See id.
127 HIGH NOON, supra note 78, at 2. R
128 Jena McGregor, Why Silence Now Has a Cost, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/02/20/why-silence-now-has-
a-cost/.
129 Tory Newmyer, Non-Tech Companies Mostly Silent on Trump’s Travel Ban, FORTUNE
(Jan. 30, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/30/companies-silent-trump-travel-ban/. CEOs in
the tech sector have overall tended to be the most vocal on social issues, with 45% of commu-
nications and marketing executives of tech companies reporting activism from their own CEO,
compared with 33% to 37% in other industries. WEBER SHANDWICK & KRC RESEARCH, CEO
ACTIVISM IN 2018: INSIDE COMMS AND MARKETING 20 (2019), https://www.webershandwick
.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CEO-Activism-Inside-Comms-and-Marketing.pdf.
130 Phil Wahba, Starbucks Has a Response to President Trump’s Immigration Ban: Hire
10,000 Refugees, FORTUNE (Jan. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/29/donald-trump-mus-
lim-ban-starbucks/. “I write to you today with deep concern, a heavy heart and a resolute
promise,” Schultz wrote in a letter to all Starbucks employees. “We are living in an unprece-
dented time, one in which we are witness to the conscience of our country, and the promise of
the American Dream, being called into question.” Id.
131 Jacob Siegal, Google Fights Trump’s Immigration Ban with $4 Million Crisis Fund,
BGR (Jan. 30, 2017), http://bgr.com/2017/01/30/google-crisis-fund-immigration-ban-aclu/.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\9-2\HLB203.txt unknown Seq: 21 16-DEC-19 10:53
2019] Woke Capital: The Role of Corporations in Social Movements 461
staff were affected by the Muslim Ban.132 Lyft also made a substantial contri-
bution to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).133 Airbnb offered free
housing for refugees or those impacted by the Muslim Ban.134 “[T]he order
and what it stands for goes directly against Airbnb’s core mission and the
product it sells. [Airbnb’s] stated purpose . . . is belonging . . .[,] that it
brings people together and that ‘anyone can belong anywhere.’” 135 Indeed,
Airbnb executives refer to its platform as the “UN at the kitchen table.”136
Only sixteen percent of its listings and two of their top ten cities (Los Ange-
les and New York) are in the United States.137 Airbnb’s refugee relief efforts
are not new and in fact began in 2015 “when it began offering free housing
to relief workers in Greece, Serbia and Macedonia, and added a donation
tool to its website where members of its platform could contribute. [Airbnb]
says it has housed 3,000 workers and raised $1.6 million so far.”138 Pilot
programs such as the “‘livelihood’ program in Jordan . . . helps refugees
living in camps earn income by giving tours and providing other ‘local ex-
periences’ to travelers visiting Jordan.”139
However, not all of corporate America voiced their opposition to the
Muslim Ban.140 In fact, outside of Silicon Valley, not much was said.141
“[T]he leaders of Apple . . . , Google and Facebook . . . emailed their staff
to denounce the suspension of the U.S. refugee program and the halting of
arrivals from seven Muslim-majority countries . . .”142 In contrast, “many of
132 Joseph Hincks, Google is Putting Up $4 Million to Help Those Affected by Trump’s
Immigration Order, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/30/google-four-mil-
lion-crisis-fund-immigration-ban/. “The $4 million—a composite of a $2 million fund put up
by Google, and up to $2 million more in employee donations—will be donated to the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, the International Rescue
Committee and the United Nation’s refugee agency (UNHCR).” Id.
133 Darrell Etherington, Lyft Donates $1 Million to the ACLU, Condemns Trump’s Immi-
gration Actions, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 29, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/29/lyft-do-
nates-1m-to-the-aclu-condemns-trumps-immigration-actions/.
134 Leigh Gallagher, President Trump Wants to Keep Them Out. Airbnb is Inviting Them
In, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/29/donald-trump-muslim-ban-airbnb/.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Harriet Taylor, How Airbnb is Growing a Far-Flung Global Empire, CNBC (June
8, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/01/how-airbnb-is-growing-a-far-flung-global-empire
.html.
138 Gallagher, supra note 134. R
139 Id. “It has also been working with resettlement agencies on programs that would iden-
tify hosts in the U.S. and elsewhere who might be interested in temporarily housing refugees.”
Id. Note that some may cynically say that the companies engaged in such help for good public
relations and are not altruistically motivated.
140 Fortune Editors & Reuters, Outside Silicon Valley, Not Much Outcry Against Immigra-
tion Ban, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/30/outside-silicon-valley-not-
much-outcry-against-immigration-ban/ [hereinafter Outside Silicon Valley].
141 Id.; see also Newmyer, supra note 129 (noting that only a handful of non-high technol- R
ogy companies spoke out against the Muslim Ban, including Ford, General Electric, Goldman
Sachs, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, and Starbucks).
142 Outside Silicon Valley, supra note 140. Sergey Brin, a co-founder of Google, even R
joined the protests at San Francisco International Airport, in his personal capacity. T.C. Sottek,
Google Co-founder Sergey Brin Joins Protest Against Immigration Order at San Francisco
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their counterparts in other industries either declined comment or responded
with company statements reiterating their commitment to diversity.”143
In looking at the mission statements of some of the most vocal mem-
bers of the high technology corporations—Airbnb, Apple, and Alphabet—
there is an evident tie between the mission statement or diversity and inclu-
sion statements of these corporations and the actions that they each individu-
ally took. Airbnb’s mission statement evolved over time and was eventually
encapsulated in two words: “Belong anywhere.”144
Apple’s diversity and inclusion statement reads: “Open. Humanity is
plural, not singular. The best way the world works is everybody in. Nobody
out.”145 In Google’s code of conduct, it famously said, “Don’t be evil.”146
After Google’s corporate restructuring under Alphabet Inc., its code of con-
duct was changed to, “Do the right thing.”147 Ultimately it was Alphabet’s
understanding (as well as other high technology companies) that the life-
blood of Silicon Valley was immigrants. It was this understanding that
played a significant role in rallying this particular community to the defense
of immigrants.148 In this way, the actions of high technology companies may
have been partially motivated by practical concerns, such as maintaining the
ability to attract immigrant talent.149 According to a 2016 report from the
National Foundation for American Policy, a nonprofit, non-partisan public
Airport, VERGE (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/28/14428262/google-
sergey-brin.
143 Outside Silicon Valley, supra note 140. R
144 Leigh Gallagher, How Airbnb Found a Mission—and a Brand, FORTUNE (Dec. 22,
2016), http://fortune.com/airbnb-travel-mission-brand/; Diversity and Belonging, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/diversity. The best summary of Airbnb’s expansive mission comes
from CEO Brian Chesky: “At the heart of our mission is the idea that people are fundamen-
tally good and every community is a place where you can belong. I sincerely believe that
[discrimination] is the greatest challenge we face as a company. It cuts to the core of who we
are and the values that we stand for.” Id.
145 Inclusion & Diversity, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/diversity/.
146 Peter Ward, What Google’s ‘Don’t Be Evil’ Slogan Can Teach You About Creating Your




148 Ethan Baron, H-1B: Foreign Citizens Make Up Nearly Three-Quarters of Silicon Val-
ley Tech Workforce, Report Says, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.mercurynews
.com/2018/01/17/h-1b-foreign-citizens-make-up-nearly-three-quarters-of-silicon-valley-tech-
workforce-report-says/ (“About 71 percent of tech employees in the Valley are foreign born
. . . .”); Ian Hathaway, Almost Half of Fortune 500 Companies Were Founded By American
Immigrants or Their Children, BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/12/04/almost-half-of-fortune-500-companies-were-founded-
by-american-immigrants-or-their-children/ (“Immigrants found . . . half of Silicon Valley high-
tech startups.”).
149 See Mark Latonero, Tech Companies Should Speak Up for Refugees, Not Only Highly-
Skilled Immigrants, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 16, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/tech-compa
nies-should-speak-up-for-refugees-not-only-high-skilled-immigrants.
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policy research organization, more than half of all U.S.-based unicorns150
were founded or co-founded by immigrants.151
As one of the most famous corporations in the world (though not a high
technology company), Starbucks clearly stated its opposition to the Muslim
Ban. Looking at Starbucks’ mission statement and commitment to inclusion
on its website, it is clear that speaking out against the Muslim Ban was
congruent with both. Its mission statement reads: “To inspire and nurture the
human spirit – one person, one cup and one neighborhood at a time.”152
Under the Starbucks credo, diversity is a value and is valued. In defining its
commitment to inclusion, Starbucks states on its website, “[e]mbracing di-
versity . . . enhances our work culture . . . [and] drives our business success
. . . . [T]he inclusion of these diverse experiences and perspectives [creates]
a culture of empowerment, one that fosters innovation, economic growth and
new ideas.”153
Starbucks presents an interesting example of a corporation that did not
have an overt stake in this particular movement. However, as Part I points
out, millennials now expect corporations to stand for something—as
Starbucks does—and in doing so Starbucks appears to align with the value
of stakeholder theory. Not only does Starbucks work to advance the interest
of its shareholders, but it also tries to improve the lives of its employees
(through college scholarships)154 and the communities that it serves (through
environmental initiatives, employment opportunities for veterans and immi-
grants, etc.).155 Indeed, Starbucks’ involvement in social issues extends well
beyond immigration and encompasses each of the social movements de-
scribed in Part II.156
150 Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57
B.C. L. REV. 583 (2016).
151 STUART ANDERSON, IMMIGRANTS AND BILLION DOLLAR STARTUPS 1 (2016), https://
nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Immigrants-and-Billion-Dollar-Startups.NFAP-Policy-
Brief.March-2016.pdf.
152 Lawrence Gregory, Starbucks Coffee’s Vision Statement & Mission Statement,
PANMORE INSTITUTE (Jan. 31, 2017), http://panmore.com/starbucks-coffee-vision-statement-
mission-statement.
153 Inclusion at Starbucks, STARBUCKS, https://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/commu
nity/diversity-and-inclusion.
154 Ben Rooney, Starbucks to Give Workers a Full Ride for College, CNN MONEY (Apr. 6,
2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/06/pf/college/starbucks-college-tuition-arizona-state/in
dex.html.
155 Starbucks Makes Global Commitment to Hire 10,000 Refugees By 2022, STARBUCKS,
https://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community/refugee-hiring.
156 See discussion infra sections II.B and II.C. Note, however, that just because a particu-
lar corporation is a leader on social issues, that does not always mean that it gets things right.
There are certainly missteps along the way. Take for example an April 2018 incident reported
by the media where two African-American men were arrested for waiting at a Starbucks in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for their friend. Phil McCausland, Protests Follow Outrage After
Two Black Men Arrested at Philly Starbucks, NBC (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcnews
.com/news/us-news/protests-follow-outrage-after-two-black-men-arrested-philly-starbucks-n8
66141.
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What is also striking is that those corporations who spoke against the
Muslim Ban were both private at the time (for example, Airbnb157 and
Uber158) and public (Alphabet,159 Amazon,160 Apple,161 and Facebook162).163
The weight of private companies, especially unicorns, becomes even more
apparent in social movements since some of them are more well-known than
even America’s most iconic companies.164
Prompted by the public outcry and chaos that ensued when the Muslim
Ban was first introduced, a revised travel ban on majority-Muslim countries
was issued in March 2017.165 The changes included removing Iraq from the
list and clarifying that visa holders from such countries could still enter the
United States.166 In addition to being narrower, the national security rationale
was made in greater detail.167 In response, fifty-eight high technology com-
157 It is unclear when Airbnb will go public. See Sriram Iyer & Ruqayyah Moynihan, ‘We
Have Not Decided If We Will Go Public in 2019’: Airbnb Cofounder Hints at IPO Timing,
BUSINESS INSIDER INDIA (Mar. 13, 2019, 9:37 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/exclu
sive-airbnb-may-defer-its-ipo-plan-2019-3.
158 See America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/compa-
nies/uber/ (listing Uber as number fifty) (last visited Feb. 3, 2019). At the time of the Muslim
Ban, Uber was a private company. It filed to go public on April 11, 2019. Uber Technologies,
Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 11, 2019). It is currently a public company.
159 See Alphabet Replaces Google as Publicly Traded Company, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/business/alphabet-replaces-google-as-publicly-
traded-company.html.
160 See Peter Cohan, Amazon Is a Publicly-Traded Startup — Get Over It!, FORBES (Oct.
24, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2014/10/24/amazon-is-a-publicly-traded-
startup-get-over-it/.
161 See Jeff Sommer & Karl Russell, Apple Is the Most Valuable Public Company Ever.
But How Much of a Record Is That?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/12/05/your-money/apple-market-share.html.
162 See Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Trading Sets Record IPO Volume, CNN MONEY (May
18, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/18/technology/facebook-ipo-trading/index.htm.
163 A team of University of Washington academics recently created a “liberalism” rating
scale for corporations that measures organizational political ideology—an organization’s sup-
port of corporate social responsibility—based on employees’ donations to the two major politi-
cal parties in the United States. See Abhinav Gupta, Forrest Briscoe & Donald C. Hambrick,
Red, Blue, and Purple Firms: Organizational Political Ideology and Corporate Social Respon-
sibility, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1018 (2017). They found that liberal-leaning companies tend
to engage in more actions consistent with a strong support of corporate social responsibility
than their conservative counterparts. Id. Using data from the 2012 election cycle, they found
that Google scored the most liberal at 89, Amazon at 84, Facebook at 79, Starbucks at 77,
Microsoft at 76, Apple at 72, and Intel at 61. E-mail from Abhinav Gupta, Assistant Professor,
University of Washington Foster School of Business, to Jennifer S. Fan, Assistant Professor,
University of Washington School of Law (Oct. 25, 2018, 2:16 PM) (on file with author).
164 Breakthrough Brands 2017, FORTUNE (Dec. 22, 2016), http://fortune.com/break-
through-brands-marketing-2017/.
165 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Colin Lecher, Trump
Tries Again with Revised Immigration Ban, VERGE (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/
2017/3/6/14828624/trump-immigration-ban-revised-order.
166 Kim Soffen & Darla Cameron, What Trump Changed in the New Travel Ban, WASH.
POST (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-compare-
travel-ban/.
167 The newly issued order only applied to new visas from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen; it also closed (temporarily) the U.S. refugee program. Josie Cox, Donald
Trump Travel Ban: Dozens of Companies Including Airbnb, Lyft and Pinterest Take Fresh
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panies filed another amicus brief in protest.168 This time, however, Alphabet,
Apple, Microsoft, and Netflix (all corporations that are publicly traded) were
not among those companies. Instead, private companies (some of which
have now gone public) took the lead; Lyft, Airbnb, and Dropbox were
among this cohort.169 The amicus brief stated that the revised ban “would
inflict significant and irreparable harm on U.S. businesses and their employ-
ees.”170 After their initial, vocal support, some of the most well-known high
technology companies were noticeably absent; there was not a sustained
leadership commitment from the publicly-held corporations in this social
movement. This is one of the perils of corporations’ involvement with social
movements—they may not always be a steadfast partner. Instead, while they
may bring resources to bear at the critical beginning stages, corporate sup-
port may dwindle and move on to other things as time passes and the partic-
ular issue is no longer under the scrutiny of the press.
When the two predominant suits over the second Muslim Ban first
reached the Court,171 161 technology companies filed an amicus brief against
the government’s position.172 Later, in March of 2018, 112 companies, in-
cluding technology companies, filed another amicus brief in support of Ha-
waii’s continuing suit after Presidential Proclamation 9645, which expanded
and replaced the second Muslim Ban, was issued.173 Ultimately, the Court
upheld President Trump’s third version of the Muslim Ban. In a five-to-four
vote, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “The entry suspension is an act that is
well within executive authority and could have been taken by any other pres-
Legal Action, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/
news/donald-trump-travel-ban-muslims-latest-airbnb-lyft-pinterest-companies-hawaii-immigra
tion-us-a7632561.html.
168 Brief of Amici Curiae Technology Companies and Other Businesses in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119
(D. Haw. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC).
169 Id. Lyft began publicly trading on March 29, 2019, beating Uber in the race to go
public. DealBook Briefing: It’s Lyft I.P.O. Day, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/business/dealbook/lyft-ipo.html?searchResultPosition=66; see also
Andrew J. Hawkins, Lyft becomes the first ride-hail company to go public, beating Uber,
VERGE (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/1/18246328/lyft-ipo-ride-share-
bikes-scooters-uber-public-sec. Dropbox went public in March 2018. See Matthew Lynley,
Dropbox Soars More Than 40% in its Debut as a Publicly-Traded Company, TECHCRUNCH
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/23/dropbox-pops-more-than-40-in-its-public-
debut-as-a-publicly-traded-company/.
170 Brief of Amici Curiae Technology Companies and Other Businesses in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d
1119 (D. Haw. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC).
171 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
172 Brief of 161 Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) & Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392 (2018) (Nos. 16-436 & 16-1540).
173 Brief of U.S. Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Ha-
waii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017).
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ident—the only question is evaluating the actions of this particular president
in promulgating an otherwise valid proclamation.”174 Not as many technol-
ogy executives said anything in the aftermath of the decision.175 Microsoft
president, Brad Smith, said in a tweet, “While disappointed with today’s
[Court] travel ban decision, we will continue to support the legal rights of
our employees and their families.”176 The CEO of Airbnb, Brian Chesky,
joined by his two co-founders, issued a statement: “We are profoundly dis-
appointed by the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the travel ban—a pol-
icy that goes against our mission and values. To restrict travel based on a
person’s nationality or religion is wrong.”177
In the context of the opposition to the Muslim Ban, which is only a part
of the larger immigrant rights movement, only a segment of corporations
from a particular industry voiced its opposition. Nevertheless, given the visi-
bility of these industries, there was near-daily reporting of actions under-
taken to disassemble what some deemed to be the pernicious effects of the
Muslim Ban.178 Using the framing analysis originating from social move-
ments, the frame projected was the objection to the Muslim Ban which for-
bade a particular group of people based on their religion and country of
origin from entering the United States. The frame participants in this case
were the high technology companies who each had a significant number of
employees who were immigrants; in fact, the CEOs of a number of them
were immigrants themselves. Together, these companies banded together to
mobilize an army of lawyers to file amicus briefs.179 But they did not rely on
the law alone. Instead, they amplified the impact of their actions by pledging
help to the immigrant community in the form of jobs and the funding of
174 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
175 “Google, Apple, Facebook, and Uber all declined or did not respond to a request for
comment.” Robinson Meyer, The Tech Industry Is Fighting Trump—and Mostly Losing, AT-
LANTIC (June 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/tech-compan
ies-travel-ban-muslim/563786/.
176 Id.
177 Brian Chesky (@bchesky), TWITTER (June 26, 2018, 10:07 AM), https://twitter.com/
bchesky/status/1011657266473234433.
178 See, e.g., Erin Schrode, 10 Concrete Ways to Take Action Against the Muslim Ban,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/10-concrete-ways-
to-take-action-against-the-muslim-ban_us_588e205ce4b017637794fdcf; Rachel Abrams et al.,
Starbucks, Exxon, Apple: Companies Challenging (or Silent on) Trump’s Immigration Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/trump-immi-
gration-ban-company-reaction.html; Tory Newmyer, David Morris, Madeline Farber & Lu-
cinda Shen, 23 Huge Companies That Have Responded to President Trump’s Immigration Ban,
FORTUNE (Jan. 31, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/31/donald-trump-immigration-ban-re-
sponses/; Janko Roettgers, Apple May Take Legal Action Against Trump Travel and Immigra-
tion Ban, VARIETY (Feb. 1, 2017), http://variety.com/2017/digital/news/apple-trump-travel-
ban-1201975518/.
179 Conger, supra note 122; Chaim Gartenburg, Airbnb, Lyft, and 56 Other Tech Compa- R
nies File Brief Opposing Trump’s Revised Travel Ban, VERGE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www
.theverge.com/2017/3/15/14935530/airbnb-lyft-file-amicus-brief-opposing-trumps-revised-
travel-ban.
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nonprofit organizations that have expertise in these areas.180 In this particular
example, corporations helped the immigrant rights social movement in a
multi-pronged way: legal, economic, social, and political. Their support was
both overt and covert. Interestingly, in terms of this particular movement,
corporations took the reins and jumped to action while deploying their ample
resources (both financially and in terms of the teams of people at their dispo-
sal) to take the lead in the legal actions taking place. Meanwhile, nonprofit
organizations (some of which were eventually funded by corporations) mo-
bilized volunteers, worked in concert with corporations’ in-house counsel,
and sought funding to help those affected by the Muslim Ban at airports and
elsewhere.181 In the end, however, even with the support of corporations, the
Muslim Ban was not overturned. It is difficult to tell whether the sustained
commitment of all the corporations which participated when the Muslim
Ban first went into effect (even if it was only limited to high technology
companies) would have made a difference.
B. Finding Moral Ground: How Corporations Found a Role
in the Gun Control Movement
Thirty-one out of every million people in the United States die from
gun homicides182—“the equivalent of 27 people shot dead every day of the
year.”183 Since 1968, when Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Senator Robert F.
Kennedy were assassinated, at least 1.6 million Americans have been killed
by guns (victims of suicides or homicides); this is more than the number of
Americans who died in all of our country’s wars altogether.184
Mass shootings, particularly those at schools, have become increasingly
common. Since the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Newtown,
Connecticut, in 2012, where a gunman killed twenty-six people (twenty first
graders and six adults), 239 school shootings have occurred nationwide with
180 See discussion supra notes 130–137. R
181 Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s Order,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawyers-trump-muslim-
ban-immigration.html (describing the number of attorneys for nonprofits, law firms who
helped immigrants affected by the Ban); Lucy Westcott, Thousands of Lawyers Descend on
U.S. Airports to Fight Trump’s Immigrant Ban, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.news-
week.com/lawyers-volunteer-us-airports-trump-ban-549830 (noting that over 4,000 lawyers
signed up to help through the nonprofit corporation, International Refugee Assistance Project).
182 Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, Comparing Gun Deaths by Country: The U.S. Is
in a Different World, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/up
shot/compare-these-gun-death-rates-the-us-is-in-a-different-world.html.
183 Id. “The homicides include losses from mass shootings, like Sunday’s Las Vegas at-
tack, the Orlando, Fla., nightclub shooting in June 2016, or the San Bernardino, Calif., shoot-
ing in December 2015. And of course, they also include the country’s vastly more common
single-victim killings.” Id.
184 Clyde Haberman, Do Stronger Gun Laws Stand a Chance? It’s Been an Uphill Battle,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/us/gun-control-laws-retro-
report.html (stating approximately 1.4 million Americans died in all the wars this country has
fought).
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438 people shot and 138 killed as of June 2016.185 In the aftermath of the
shooting, the U.S. Senate did not pursue legislation encompassing assault
weapons and magazines and was unable to pass even background checks
legislation in its watered-down form.186 After the Sandy Hook shooting, cor-
porations took little action.187
In contrast, in the wake of the 2018 high school shooting in Parkland,
Florida, a “perfect storm” of student activism, online savvy, and the current
political climate converged to create a new norm where gun control became
mainstream.188 Young activists helped to shift the norm on the gun control
debate from something that was not mainstream to something that is.189
ThinkProgress, a nonprofit corporation,190 published a list of thirty-two com-
panies with relationships to the NRA,191 on February 20, 2018.192 Numerous
185 Jugal K. Patel, After Sandy Hook, More Than 400 People Have Been Shot in Over 200
School Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/
15/us/school-shootings-sandy-hook-parkland.html. But cf. Chris Wilson, This Chart Shows the
Number of School Shooting Victims Since Sandy Hook, TIME (Feb. 22, 2018), http://time.com/
5168272/how-many-school-shootings/ (pointing out discrepancies in numbers of shootings be-
tween Time’s study versus the New York Times’ study).
186 “It was a profoundly bitter day, punctuated by Obama excoriating Congress for its
failure to act.” Jason Cherkis & Sam Stein, How Congress Utterly Failed In Its Response To
The Sandy Hook Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST (July 5, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/congress-sandy-hook-newtown_us_5952822de4b0da2c731ed66b. In contrast, some
states took action after Sandy Hook. Massachusetts has required permits for guns since 1968
and already had the strictest gun control laws in the country in 2013 when the Sandy Hook
shooting occurred. Jonathan Cohn, This Is The Toughest Gun Law In America, MSN (May 6,
2018), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/this-is-the-toughest-gun-law-in-america/ar-AAwP
faZ. However, after Sandy Hook, Massachusetts strengthened its gun laws by expanding po-
lice discretion to issue gun permits to rifles and shotguns. An Act Relative to the Reduction of
Gun Violence, 2014 Mass. Acts ch. 284.
187 See, e.g., Saya Weissman, Bad Brand Social Responses to Sandy Hook Tragedy,
DIGIDAY (Dec. 17, 2012), https://digiday.com/marketing/bad-brand-social-responses-to-sandy-
hook-tragedy/.
188 Derek Thompson, Why Are Corporations Finally Turning Against the NRA?, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/02/nra-discounts-corpora
tions/554264/.
189 “An eloquent, quick-witted group of young survivors has created a new political and
moral electricity. In only two weeks, regulation of assault weapons — thwarted and danced
around by lawmakers for years — has become an urgent and mainstream concern.” Heidi N.
Moore, Corporations Only Break with the Gun Industry When It’s Cheap and Easy, WASH.
POST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/03/01/
dont-be-fooled-companies-cut-ties-to-the-nra-only-when-its-cheap-and-easy/.
190 Jedd Legum, Welcome To The New ThinkProgress, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 8, 2016),
https://thinkprogress.org/welcome-to-the-new-thinkprogress-14fd01bda9cc/.
191 Kira Lerner & Josh Israel, The NRA is Being Supported by These Companies, THINK-
PROGRESS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/corporations-nra-f0d8074f2ca7/. The NRA
is a nonprofit corporation with tax-exempt status. Alexandra F. O’Neill & Daniel P. O’Neill,
The NRA, a Tax-Exempt Loaded with Private Interest, THE COALITION TO STOP GUN VIO-
LENCE, https://www.csgv.org/nra-tax-exempt-loaded-private-interest/.
192 The publication of these names “sparked a movement, prompting people around the
country to take to their phones and social media and call on those companies to sever ties with
the massive gun lobbying group.” Danielle McLean, How Corporate Pressure Changed the
National Conversation on Gun Control, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 2, 2018), https://thinkprogress
.org/corporate-pressure-gun-control-2932cf771931/. Furthermore, “[t]he protests have since
transformed into a widespread phenomenon, with public pressure forcing a diverse set of com-
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companies severed long-standing ties with the NRA, including Budget,
Delta Airlines (Delta), Dick’s Sporting Goods, and Symantec.193 Delta,
which employs 33,000 people in the state of Georgia, announced that it
would discontinue its discounts for NRA members.194 This action met with
swift reprisal from the Republican-controlled Georgia state legislature;195 it
eliminated a proposed tax break on jet fuel that was estimated to be worth
$40 million in savings for Delta.196 Walmart, a Delaware corporation, said it
would increase the minimum age for firearm purchases to twenty-one and
remove certain items from its website that looked similar to assault-style
panies to enter into the gun control debate in a number of different ways.” Id. As of March 2,
2018, twenty-four companies had ended their relationship with the NRA. Id.
193 Melina Delkic, Here Are the Businesses Boycotting Guns or the NRA, NEWSWEEK
(Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/here-are-businesses-boycotting-guns-nra-823697
(listing the names of businesses “that have stopped selling guns; cut ties or stopped discount
programs with the NRA; or boycotted gun violence in some way in the wake of the Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School shooting”). “This avalanche of companies abandoning the
NRA is just the latest chapter in the gradual politicization of every square inch of the public
sphere, which has compelled traditionally nonpartisan companies to take one partisan stand
after another.” Thompson, supra note 188 (providing other examples, which include Uber’s R
then-CEO Travis Kalanick resigning from the White House advisory council after the travel
ban; Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, and Bob Iger, CEO of Disney, leaving the same council after
President Trump withdrew from the Paris climate agreement; and Kenneth Frazier, Merck’s
CEO, leaving the manufacturing council after President Trump refused to condemn protesters
in Charlottesville). For clarification, Symantec is a company that specializes in cybersecurity.
Technology Overview, SYMANTEC, https://www.symantec.com/about/corporate-profile/technol-
ogy (last visited Dec. 31, 2018). In a similar fashion, the Strategy & Policy Forum and the
Manufacturing Council—two business advisory councils composed of top American corporate
leaders that advised President Trump—disbanded in response to Trump’s equivocal remarks on
the violence in Charlottesville in August 2017. Jena McGregor & Damian Paletta, Trump’s
Business Advisory Councils Disband as CEOs Abandon President Over Charlottesville Views,
WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/
08/16/after-wave-of-ceo-departures-trump-ends-business-and-manufacturing-councils/. CEOs
from companies such as JP Morgan, Campbell Soup, 3M, General Electric, Merck, and John-
son & Johnson resigned from the councils or made statements against racism and white
supremacy to counter Trump’s message. Id.
194 Scott Neuman, Georgia Lawmakers Punish Delta Air Lines over NRA Feud, NPR
(Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/02/590149921/georgia-law
makers-punish-delta-air-lines-over-nra-feud. Note that Delta has over 100 million domestic
passengers a year; the NRA has only a few million members and not all of them travel by
plane. See Thompson, supra note 188. In June 2018, the CEO of Delta, Ed Bastian, said at R
Fortune’s CEO Initiative conference that he cut Delta’s ties with the NRA based on the com-
pany’s values and did not check with the board before making his decisions; the board was
supportive in the aftermath of his statement. Beth Kowitt, Delta CEO Didn’t Check with Board
Before Cutting Ties With NRA, FORTUNE (June 26, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/06/26/delta-
ceo-nra-parkland-board-of-directors/. Only thirteen people had signed up for the discount in
2018. Id.
195 See Neuman, supra note 194. R
196 Id. Some constitutional law scholars pointed out that the Georgia state legislature’s
actions could be construed as a First Amendment violation since they punished Delta for its
free speech, but the fact that Delta did not already have the tax break made the analysis more
nuanced. Miriam Valverde, Casey Cagle’s tweet on Delta, the NRA and tax breaks. Is it legal?,
POLITIFACT (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.politifact.com/georgia/article/2018/mar/01/does-casey-
cagles-tweet-delta-suggest-constitution/.
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rifles, including non-lethal airsoft guns and toys.197 Well-known clothing
company L.L.Bean, a Maine corporation, announced it would no longer sell
guns or ammunitions to any person under twenty-one years of age. Kroger,
an Ohio corporation in the supermarket industry, followed suit stating that it
would increase the minimum age for gun purchases and ammunition to
twenty-one years of age at its Fred Meyer stores.198 Over the last few years,
gun sales have decreased.199 Coupled with the fact that support for gun con-
trol is the highest it has been in twenty-five years and the NRA is increas-
ingly growing out of favor with the public, corporations have largely sided
with the gun control movement.200 Professor Robert Spitzer at the State Uni-
versity of New York at Cortland, who studies crime, law and policy, and gun
control, stated that the reason corporations can impact the national debate on
gun control is because they are not normally part of the political fray: “They
seem to be sensing that the great middle of America is being roused and
moved, that the NRA is seen as ever more marginal, dogmatic, and unyield-
ing, so there is both a [public relations] and commercial reason for [corpo-
rations] to stake out their recent public positions.”201
Some commentators noted that the actions taken by these companies
“[were] not a brave moral stand by America’s corporate sector. The compa-
nies understand that it is a transaction . . . .”202 In fact, for financial reasons,
some companies chose to continue business as usual. As an example, FedEx
ships (and will continue to ship) guns for the NRA as well as eighty-six
firearms manufacturers and dealers.203 FedEx stated it “‘has never set or
changed rates for any of our millions of customers around the world in re-
sponse to their politics, beliefs or positions on issues,’ and that the NRA is
one of ‘hundreds of organizations’ that pay discounted rates for shipping.”204
High technology companies with a broad consumer base, such as Amazon
and Apple, have struggled to find the middle ground in these highly charged
debates.205




199 See Moore, supra note 189. R
200 Id.
201 Dominic Rushe, Will Corporate Backlash Against Guns Actually Change Anything?,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/02/will-corporate-
backlash-against-guns-actually-change-anything.
202 Moore, supra note 189. “It costs these companies almost nothing to stop offering dis- R
counts to the relatively paltry membership of the NRA, and in exchange, executives can win a
reputation boost and customer goodwill you can’t pay for.” Id.
203 Id.
204 Julia Horowitz, FedEx and UPS Go Back and Forth Over the NRA, CNN MONEY (Feb.
28, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/28/news/companies/fedex-ups-nra-fight/index.html.
205 “At issue is NRA TV, a free online channel focused on pro-gun content, which many
technology companies offer through their streaming services and devices alongside more pop-
ular options such as Netflix, ESPN and HBO.” Spencer Soper & Selina Wang, Amazon, Apple
Struggle to Sit out NRA Gun-Control Debate, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www
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Some may argue that the involvement of corporations in social move-
ments, such as the gun control movement, is a positive development because
our institutions have failed. This institutional failure has created a vacuum
which corporations are now filling. “[T]he fact that companies, rather than
Congress or the courts, are shifting in response to political activism in the
United States says something profound—about American tribalism, the de-
mise of political cooperation, and the rise of a sort of liberal
corporatocracy.”206 In other words, corporations have been moved to action
and leadership because they can get things done in a way that the courts or
Congress cannot. It is not immediately obvious whether this is a normatively
positive or negative development. To the extent corporations are otherwise
filling a role that other organizations were designed to fill, but have not,
there is an argument to be made that corporate involvement is a good thing
to prevent gridlock. Others may posit that the role of the corporation is in the
business realm and that corporations should not involve themselves in social
movements. In fact, there is an opposing argument that corporate involve-
ment may needlessly complicate already complex matters even more.
Interestingly, one of the companies to come out most strongly against
gun control was not a corporation, but a co-op. REI, a Seattle-based outdoors
co-op, announced that it would suspend orders of ski goggles, water bottles,
bike helmets, and other products from well-known brands like CamelBak,
Giro, and Bolle, because Vista Outdoor, their parent company, produces am-
munition and assault-style rifles.207 REI put out the following statement in
connection with its action: “[I]t is the job of companies that manufacture
and sell guns and ammunition to work towards common sense solutions that
prevent the type of violence that happened in Florida . . . . Vista does not
plan to make a public statement that outlines a clear plan of action.”208 REI’s
actions are well in line with its mission statement which states: “As a pur-
pose-driven cooperative, REI’s business and core purpose are intertwined—
we grow our business by furthering our purpose. We’re committed to pro-
moting environmental stewardship and increasing access to outdoor
recreation.”209
In the wake of the shooting in Parkland, BlackRock, the largest  invest-
ment firm in the world, said that it was reassessing its holdings in gun mak-
ers and gun retailers.210 It is the largest shareholder in Sturm Ruger and
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-28/amazon-apple-struggle-to-sit-out-nra-gun-control-
debate.
206 See Thompson, supra note 188. R
207 Gene Johnson, Bike Helmets, Ski Goggles Swept up in Gun Control Debate, U.S. NEWS
(Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2018-03-02/bike-helmets-ski-
goggles-swept-up-in-gun-control-debate.
208 Id.
209 REI, REI Overview, https://www.rei.com/about-rei/business.
210 BlackRock manages trillions of dollars for investors ranging from major pensions to
endowments to mom and pop fund investors. Chris Isidore, BlackRock Turns Up the Pressure
on Gun Makers, CNN MONEY (Mar. 2, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/03/02/investing/
blackrock-gunmakers/index.html.
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American Outdoor Brand, the owner of Smith & Wesson (both gun makers),
and the second largest shareholder in Vista Outdoor.211 Moreover, Black-
Rock announced that “it will start offering clients the option to invest in
funds that exclude firearm manufacturers and retailers.”212 BlackRock also
said it would engage more actively with gun manufacturers and may vote
against the wishes of company management in some circumstances.213 Fund
managers have historically viewed their role as “stewards of investor
money, not social or political activists.”214 However, Larry Fink, the CEO of
BlackRock, signaled in early 2018, pre-Parkland, that he envisioned a differ-
ent role for corporations. In his annual letter to CEOs titled “Sense of Pur-
pose,” Mr. Fink said, “We . . . see many governments failing to prepare for
the future, on issues ranging from retirement and infrastructure to automa-
tion and worker retraining. As a result, society increasingly is turning to the
private sector and asking that companies respond to broader societal chal-
lenges.”215 Mr. Fink continued, “the public expectations of your company
have never been greater. Society is demanding that companies, both public
and private, serve a social purpose. To prosper over time, every company
must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a
positive contribution to society.”216 In his letter, Mr. Fink championed a
stakeholder theory of corporate law by pointing out that “[c]ompanies must
benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, custom-
ers, and the communities in which they operate.”217 Indeed, Mr. Fink’s letter
is identical to what progressive corporate scholars have long argued for: cor-
porations should consider all of their stakeholders in making their decisions.
In light of the letter, it was in some ways not surprising that BlackRock took




214 Liz Moyer, BlackRock Says It’s Time to Take Action on Guns, May Use Voting Power
to Influence, CNBC (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/02/blackrock-says-its-time
-to-take-action-on-guns-may-use-voting-power-to-influence.html.
215 Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose: Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter.  Compare War-
ren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, and arguably one of the most famous investors of all
time, who answered in response to a question about doing business with gun owners, “I don’t
believe in imposing my political opinion on the activities of our businesses. . . I don’t think we
should put a question on the Geico policy form [that says]: ‘Are you a member of the NRA?
And if you are, you’re just not good enough for us.’ Or something like that.” Fred Imbert,
Warren Buffett Pleases Berkshire Hathaway’s Crowd with Answer on Not Imposing a Litmus
Test on Gun Ownership, CNBC (May 5, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/05/warrent-
buffett-doubles-down-on-doing-business-with-gun-owners.html.
216 See Fink, supra note 215. R
217 Id.
218 As one business scholar and ex-CEO pointed out:
Shareholder value is the result of having a clear mission and set of values that moti-
vate employees to serve customers. Companies that start with the mantra of “maxi-
mizing shareholder value” ultimately destroy the very shareholder value that they
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Professor William Klepper of Columbia Business School, an expert on
corporate leadership, noted that “[b]usinesses have to respond to political
crises even faster than political parties do.”219 He observes, “[p]olitics is
competitive, but the competition is constrained—by time (e.g., elections
only happen every two, four, or six years), by geography (e.g., the gerry-
mandering of districts), and by partisanship, in which every issue often boils
down to ‘the other side is worse.’” 220 Companies do not have the luxury of
any of these constraints on their competition. “Politicians assume they can
wait out the outrage, but national companies have to respond to the immedi-
acy of demand[.]”221 The strategic use of social media by savvy student
leaders created a dynamic which demanded immediate action by corpora-
tions. “Angry tweets and Facebook memes help political groups rally around
anger and perceived villainy; but also, they create unavoidable choices for
multinational companies that have to respond to political crises by picking a
side.”222
Corporate action was initially swift across a number of different indus-
tries due to the political environment that was created in the wake of Park-
land. Other than changing company policies regarding who guns were sold
to and severing any existing deals for NRA members, there were no legal
changes that corporations spearheaded nor amicus briefs they could file.
This particular social movement showcases the limitations of corporate in-
volvement from a legal perspective when the issue does not involve their
employees. Instead, it was the students of Parkland who led the gun control
movement.223 Being adept consumers of social media, #NeverAgain became
the rallying cry.224 Organized walkouts and marches occurred all over the
are trying to create because they refuse to make the long-term investments required
to create sustainable shareholder value.
Bill George, Why BlackRock CEO Larry Fink Is Not A Socialist, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2018/03/12/why-blackrock-ceo-larry-
fink-is-not-a-socialist/2/#203f3cef457c (emphasis in original).




223 Parkland students who survived the shooting, Emma Gonzalez and David Hogg, be-
came regulars on news channels and helped to broaden the movement by including other
communities affected by gun violence. See Saba Hamedy, The Parkland Kids Keep Checking
Their Privilege, CNN (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/24/politics/march-for-
our-lives-students-checking-privilege-trnd/index.html; Lori Aratani, Parkland student Emma
Gonzalez Demonstrates the Power of Silence, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/local/2018/live-updates/politics/march-for-our-lives/parkland-student-emma-
gonzalez-demonstrates-the-power-of-silence/; David Hogg & Emma Gonzalez, Since Park-
land, We’ve Been Demanding Action. Now It’s Time to Join Us., WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/05/since-parkland-weve-been-demanding-
action-now-its-time-join-us/.
224 Alyssa Newcomb, How Parkland’s Social Media-Savvy Teens Took Back the Internet –
and the Gun Control Debate, NBC (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/
how-parkland-students-are-using-social-media-keep-gun-control-n850251.
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country.225 The number of participants in March 2018 gun control rallies
surpassed those of the women’s marches in January 2018 which were held in
support of the #MeToo movement.226 The students moved the corporations to
action; they are also the ones sustaining the gun control movement. The
students continue to lead the movement by organizing more walk-outs,227
appearing frequently in the media,228 and appealing to state legislatures to
change the laws.229
In the case of this particular social movement, the frame projected was
gun control, and the alignment of the frame participants came from the stu-
dents who mobilized others, including corporations, to action. Harnessing
the power of social media and the web, the students were able to make their
opinions heard on a broad platform.230 The students shrewdly framed the
issue as a moral one and then appealed to corporations on that ground while
225 Sarah Gray, What to Know About March for Our Lives and Other Student-Led Gun
Control Protests, TIME (Mar. 12, 2018), http://time.com/5165794/student-protests-walkouts-
florida-school-shooting/.
226 Compare Ryan Sit, More Than 2 Million in 90 Percent of Voting Districts Joined
March for Our Lives Protests, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 26, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/march-
our-lives-how-many-2-million-90-voting-district-860841 (reporting that more than two million
people participated in the marches to advocate for tougher gun laws), with Hannah Golden,
How Big Were The 2018 Women’s Marches? The Numbers Are Massive, ELITE DAILY (Jan. 24,
2018), https://www.elitedaily.com/p/how-big-were-the-2018-womens-marches-the-numbers-
are-massive-8001200 (reporting that 1.5 million people participated in the women’s marches);
C.K., Gun Politics After Parkland, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.economist.com/
blogs/democracyinamerica/2018/05/neveragain.
227 In the aftermath of the Parkland shootings, “tens of thousands of students from some
3,000 schools participated in the #ENOUGH National School Walkout to demand tighter gun
control regulations.” Keith Coffman, U.S. Students Walk Out Again to Protest Gun Violence,
REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns/u-s-students-walk-out-
again-to-protest-gun-violence-idUSKBN1HR1DG. This was followed by the March 24, 2018,
“March For Our Lives” rallies that took place in cities throughout the United States; they
“were some of the biggest U.S. youth demonstrations in decades, with hundreds of thousands
of young Americans and their supporters taking to the streets.” Id. On April 20, 2018, a walk-
out was organized to honor those killed in the Columbine School shootings. Id.
228 Julie Turkewitz & Anemona Hartocollis, Highlights: Students Call for Action Across
Nation; Florida Lawmakers Fail to Take Up Assault Rifle Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/us/gun-control-florida-shooting.html.
229 The student-organized social movement has caused many state legislatures to take ac-
tion. See Madison Park, New Jersey Is One of the Latest States to Enact New Gun Control
Measures, CNN (June 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/09/us/gun-laws-since-park
land/index.html (providing information about state legislatures that have taken action since the
Parkland shootings). Some states are initiating action on their own, using novel tactics. In the
case of New Jersey, which already has strong gun laws, it is releasing firearms trafficking data
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. For example, it reported “gun-
trace data for the first quarter of 2018 to show that 77 percent of guns used in crimes in New
Jersey come from out of state.” Mike Catalini, Quick Release of Gun Data Called Trailblazing
and Troubling, AP NEWS (May 13, 2018), https://apnews.com/2b91456c75b24c899a1e3aad
0d7a6790.
230 “[S]ocial media and the web have changed the environment for business by making it
cheaper and easier for activists to join together to voice their opinions and by making corpo-
rate activities more transparent.” Davis, supra note 8. One example of the student activists’ use R
of social media occurred when they discovered that Vice President Pence would be attending
the NRA convention and no firearms were allowed. Cameron Kasky commented on the irony
of it by tweeting, “The NRA has evolved into such a hilarious parody of itself.” Cameron
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simultaneously putting them in the media spotlight, forcing corporations to
act. Interestingly, in the case of gun control, corporations punished those
identified as bad actors by the students by withdrawing financial support to
organizations viewed as disparaging of those individuals who became the
faces of the movement. These covert actions had an immediate effect. As an
example, when Fox News host Laura Ingraham mocked David Hogg, a Park-
land shooting survivor, nearly twenty advertisers pulled their ads from the
show.231
With the passage of time, however, polling suggests that gun control is
now a less pressing issue than it was when the Parkland shooting first oc-
curred;232 this is a consistent pattern with past mass shootings.233 That being
said, scholars and commentators note that this student-led movement could
be a turning point for gun control. For example, it has led to collaborations
such as Levi Strauss’ Safer Tomorrow Fund, which will “direct more than $1
million in philanthropic grants from Levi Strauss & Co. over the next four
years to fuel the work of nonprofits and youth activists who are working to
end gun violence in America.”234 According to Eric Orts, a legal studies and
Kasky (@cameron_kasky), TWITTER (Apr. 28, 2018, 6:16 AM), https://twitter.com/cameron_
kasky/status/990218168525377536.
231 The full list of advertisers who pulled their sponsorships were: Bayer, Hulu, Johnson &
Johnson, Liberty Mutual, Wayfair, TripAdvisor, Nestle, Nutrish, Ruby Tuesday, Atlantis Re-
sort, Office Depot, Jenny Craig, Expedia Group, Miracle-Ear, Ace Hardware, Stitch Fix, Prin-
ciple Financial Group, Honda, and Entertainment Studios. Carol Wolf, Laura Ingraham
Returns, with Far Fewer Advertisers, CBS NEWS (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/laura-ingraham-returns-with-far-fewer-advertisers/. The show lost approximately fifty
percent of its on-air advertisers. Id.
232 See Gun Politics After Parkland, supra note 226. R
233 Id.
And even when the will for change is there, it may make little difference to policy-
making. Most Americans support background checks for all gun-buyers and a major-
ity want a ban on assault weapons; neither has been introduced. Pew Research sug-
gests even the majority of gun owners backed a federal database to track gun sales
before the Florida tragedy. Congress has shown no desire to pass such a law.
Id. There is even a subset of supporters of the gun control movement who own guns. See Jess
Bidgood & Sabrina Tavernise, Do Gun Owners Want Gun Control? Yes, Some Say, Post-
Parkland, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/us/gun-owners-
laws-parkland.html.
234 Chip Bergh, Levi Strauss CEO: Why Business Leaders Need to Take a Stand on Gun
Violence, FORTUNE (Sept. 4, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/09/04/levi-strauss-gun-violence-
parkland/. Additionally, Levi Strauss is partnering with Everytown for Gun Safety and com-
pany executives like Michael Bloomberg to form Everytown Business Leaders for Gun Safety,
“a coalition of business leaders who believe . . . that business has a critical role to play in and a
moral obligation to do something about the gun violence epidemic in this country.” Id. Bergh
says that business leaders “simply cannot stand by silently when it comes to the issues that
threaten the very fabric of the communities where we live and work. While taking a stand can
be unpopular with some, doing nothing is no longer an option.” Id. Recently, Levi Strauss
went public. Alan Murray & David Meyer, Apple Announcements, Obamacare Gamble, Brexit
Votes: CEO Daily for March 26, 2019, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/03/
26/apple-announcements-obamacare-gamble-brexit-votes-ceo-daily-for-march-26-2019/. Its
action on gun control was just one part of a very long history of incorporating public purpose
into its business strategies. Id. A decade before Jim Crow laws were eliminated, the company
desegregated factories in the South. Id. It was also one of the early adopters of giving health
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business ethics professor at Wharton, the corporate responses to the #Never-
Again campaign are “‘quite complex’ and involve multiple factors.”235
These factors include a sense of business responsibility, consumer activism
(for example, boycotts), and investors wanting to decrease the potential risk
of investing in companies that are not on the right side of the gun rights
debate.236 Professor Orts predicted “a movement . . . similar to what we’ve
seen on fossil fuels on university campuses [concerning] investor responsi-
bility.”237 Furthermore, he believed retailers would cut their ties with suppli-
ers refusing to pledge their support to combat gun violence.238 Professor
Brian Berkey, also a legal studies and business ethics professor at Wharton,
observed, “members of the public more broadly have played the founda-
tional role in moving businesses to adopt new policies.”239 Just as corpora-
tions have done in the context of LGBTQ rights, discussed in further detail
below, they can choose to create a higher standard for gun control rather
than what is prescribed by federal law. By doing so, corporations fit squarely
within stakeholder theory as now they are not only considering interests be-
yond shareholders, but taking into account their employees and surrounding
communities as well.
C. Building Blocks for Success: How Corporations Advanced the Goals
of the LGBTQ Rights Movement
Out of all the social movements discussed in the case studies, the
LGBTQ community has advanced the furthest and is the most developed.
But in the not-too-distant past, the future of LGBTQ rights looked bleak. In
1961, “twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia required the hospital-
ization of ‘psychopathic persons,’ a term that was often a code for homosex-
uals.”240 Twenty-five years later, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
anti-sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hardwick;241 it was a blow to the LGBTQ
rights movement. In the aftermath of the decision, the architects of the
LGBTQ rights movement focused on state level advocacy.242
benefits to same-sex partners and stopped funding the Boy Scouts after it banned gay individu-
als. Id. Bergh opined, there is a “hunger for companies that are committed to a moral compass,
that are committed to doing the right thing.” Id.
235 Gun Control After Parkland: What Can Firms Really Do?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON





240 Eskridge, supra note 15, at 428. R
241 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of Georgia’s anti-sod-
omy law after he was observed and charged for engaging in consensual homosexual sodomy
with another adult in his home. Id.
242 Scott Cummings, Law and Social Movements: Reimagining the Progressive Canon,
2018 WISC. L. REV. 101, 130 (2018).
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Fast forward to 1992 and the state of the LGBTQ rights movement
began to look different. Lotus Development became the first U.S. public
company to offer domestic partner benefits for LGBTQ employees.243 This
was considered radical at the time because very few firms adopted such poli-
cies.244 “Even some companies that explicitly marketed to the gay commu-
nity were wary of providing benefits to domestic partners.”245 The efforts of
the United Automobile Workers union led Ford, General Motors, and
Chrysler to adopt domestic partner benefits in 1999;246 domestic partner ben-
efits had entered the mainstream. In 2013, Walmart—“America’s largest em-
ployer by far—was compelled to adopt domestic partner benefits after
finding that it was almost the last large retailer to do so.”247
Over twenty years ago, when President Bill Clinton’s office tried to get
CEOs to support gay rights initiatives he met with resistance.248 But then
there was a shift. Ultimately, “companies have helped to spur a rapid evolu-
tion in public opinion in the United States, with a majority of Americans
now supporting not only marriage equality but also laws to prevent discrimi-
nation against gay people.”249 In 2002, the Human Rights Campaign began
publishing the Corporate Equality Index, which ranks major companies on
their LGBTQ policies.250 At its inception, 13 out of the 319 companies sur-
veyed received perfect scores.251 In 2015, with even more stringent stan-
dards, 366 out of 781 companies had perfect scores, “including fourteen of
the top twenty on Fortune’s rankings of the largest companies in the U.S.”252
The question is: “Why have corporations shifted from ‘abiding local
custom’ around segregation and other divisive social issues to ‘bullying
elected officials’ to support LGBT[Q] rights?”253 There are several possible
answers to this question. Part of the answer may lie in the estimated $800
billion worth of buying power of the LGBTQ community.254 In addition,
according to one study, it found that there was no material difference in a
243 Davis & White, supra note 16. R
244 Id. Domestic partner benefits were limited to creative or technology companies. Id.
245 Id. “At that time it was legal in most states to fire employees for being gay, so there
could be real costs for being an out supporter.” Id. For a map of the states where it is still legal
to fire employees for being LGBTQ, please see Equality Maps: State Non-Discrimination
Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discri
mination_laws (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
246 Davis & White, supra note 16. R
247 Id. (“The early actions of social entrepreneurs ultimately changed the shape of corpo-
rate America and its standards about whose families count.”).
248 Richard Socarides, Corporate America’s Evolution on L.G.B.T. Rights, NEW YORKER






253 Davis, supra note 8. R
254 Eric Berger & Nicole Douillet, What’s the Effect of Pro-LGBT Policies on Stock
Price?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 2, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/whats-the-effect-of-pro-lgbt-
policies-on-stock-price.
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company’s stock based on its stance on LGBTQ issues and no adverse im-
pact on equity performance when instituting LGBTQ practices and poli-
cies.255 Another answer lies in changing public opinion. In a Pew Research
Center poll conducted in 2001, same-sex marriage was opposed by Ameri-
cans fifty-seven percent to thirty-five percent.256 In a 2017 poll conducted by
the Pew Research Center, the numbers had flipped: sixty-two percent sup-
ported same-sex marriage and thirty-two percent opposed.257 In short, the
consumer clout of the LGBTQ community, the absence of any material ef-
fects on stock performance when implementing LGBTQ policies, and in-
creased public support for LGBTQ rights, each played a role in changing
corporate behavior and creating a new behavioral norm where more aggres-
sive tactics were acceptable.
Recent court victories for the LGBTQ community have contributed to
the advancement of the aims of the LGBTQ rights movement as well.258
Nearly 380 corporations and employer organizations joined together to file
an amicus brief urging that the Court declare state bans on gay marriage
unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor.259 Amazon, Bristol-Meyers
Squibb, Citigroup, The Coca-Cola Company, eBay, General Mills, Intel,
Procter & Gamble, and Target were just a few of the corporations that signed
on to the brief.260 One of the most striking aspects of the amicus brief was
the sheer number of corporations who signed on to it and the fact that they
spanned many different industries. In contrast, there were far fewer corpora-
tions who signed on to the amicus briefs opposing the Muslim Ban, and
those that did were primarily from the high technology realm.261
More recently, there was controversy around religious freedom and
LGBTQ rights. When then-Governor Michael Pence tried to sign into law
Indiana’s religious freedom laws, Apple CEO Tim Cook, the first openly gay
255 Id.
256 Davis, supra note 8. R
257 Id. (showing that support for same-sex marriage has risen among different age cohorts,
race, and ideologies).
258 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples may not
be deprived of the right to marry); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (upholding the
lower court’s decision that a California law banning same-sex marriage was unconstitutional);
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (holding that the federal Defense of Marriage
Act’s definition of marriage—as a legal union between a man and a woman—was unconstitu-
tional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that state bans on sodomy were
unconstitutional).
259 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Alexander C. Kaufman, Here Are The 379 Companies Urging
The Supreme Court To Support Same-Sex Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/05/marriage-equality-amicus_n_6808260.html.
260 Id.
261 See Brief of Amici Curiae Technology Companies and Other Businesses in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119
(D. Haw. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC); Brief of 161 Technology Companies, as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct.
2080 (2017) & Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (Nos. 16-436 & 16-1540); Brief of
U.S. Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
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CEO of a major public company,262 argued that such laws were antithetical
to the company’s values. Salesforce offered to pay the relocation costs of
Indiana-based employees if they chose to move in light of the proposed
law.263 Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff believes “the days of strict adherence
to Milton Friedman’s shareholder primacy are over: ‘today CEOs need to
stand up not just for their shareholders, but their employees, their customers,
their partners, the community, the environment, schools; everybody.’” 264 In
effect, Benioff threw his support behind the LGBTQ rights movement after
considering the interests of all stakeholders, not only the shareholders of
Salesforce.265
The principles set forth by the Business Roundtable—an organization
of CEOs that works to promote a healthy economy and create more opportu-
nities for all Americans through public policy266—does not usually provide
specific guidance on social activism; instead, it looks to corporate strategy
and risk for general guidance, stating that public pronouncements by a CEO
regarding social issues should fit within the company’s overall strategy and
not pose undue risk.267 In the case of Salesforce, taking a stance on LGBTQ
issues resonated with its core values on equality.268 Likewise, Tim Cook’s
vocal support of LGBTQ rights makes sense from a corporate strategy stand-
point in light of Apple’s strong commitment to diversity.269 In a new turn of
events, in March 2019, the CEO of IBM, Ginny Rometty, in her capacity as
the head of the Education and Workforce Committee of the Business Round-
table, wrote a direct letter to Congress urging them to pass the Equality
Act.270 The Equality Act would amend existing federal civil rights laws to
262 Disparte & Gentry, supra note 82. R
263 Charles Riley, Salesforce CEO: We’re Helping Employees Move Out of Indiana, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 2, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/01/news/salesforce-benioff-indiana-reli
gious-freedom-law/index.html.
264 Chang, supra note 36, at 41. R
265 In response to the Indiana law dispute, over three dozen CEOs and senior leaders of
technology companies issued a joint statement asking state legislatures to add sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity to the list of protected classes under state civil rights laws. Nick
Wingfield, Tech Leaders Call for Anti-Discrimination Laws to Protect Gays in all 50 States,
N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Apr. 1, 2015), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/tech-leaders-call-
for-anti-discrimination-laws-to-protect-gays-in-all-50-states/. Their letter stated: “Religious
freedom, inclusion and diversity can coexist and everyone, including L.G.B.T.[Q.] people and
people of faith, should be protected under their states’ civil rights laws.” Id.
266 About Us, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us (last
visited Dec. 31, 2018).
267 It is unclear if the CEOs who made public statements in support of certain social move-
ments sought the guidance of their boards or subcommittees before making such statements.
268 Equality, SALESFORCE, https://www.salesforce.com/company/equality/ (last visited
Dec. 31, 2018) (“We believe that businesses can be powerful platforms for social change and
that our higher purpose is to drive Equality for all.”).
269 Inclusion & Diversity, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/diversity/ (last visited Dec. 31,
2018).
270 Ina Fried, IBM CEO, Business Group Call on Congress to Pass LGBT Rights Bill,
AXIOS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.axios.com/ibm-chief-1551972283-d2868b8c-7681-4b18-
aca6-f265f416e988.html. In the letter, Rometty stated:
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explicitly add sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of protected
classes.271
In March 2015, the Arkansas legislature passed House Bill 1228,272
which would have allowed LGBTQ discrimination based on “religious free-
dom.”273 The CEO of Walmart, the second largest employer in the state,274
encouraged the governor to veto the bill.275 “Not surprisingly, given
[Walmart’s] status in the state and the corporate backlash that accompanied
a similar law in Indiana, the governor obliged and eventually signed a modi-
fied bill.”276
In the case of North Carolina’s “bathroom bill,” which was passed in
2016, statewide antidiscrimination protections excluded gender identity and
sexual orientation, and mandated transgender people to use restrooms in
public buildings corresponding to the sex on their birth certificates.277 Ac-
cording to an Associated Press analysis, this bill is projected to cost the state
over $3.7 billion in lost business over a dozen years.278 Concerts, conven-
tions, sporting events, and the like have been cancelled due to the outrage
over the bill. PayPal canceled a project in Charlotte that would have resulted
As employers, America’s leading companies know that our economy works best
when our employees can be who they are, without fear of bias, discrimination, or
inequality — in the workplace or in their communities. And as Americans, we are
firmly committed to the principles of equality and fairness that have distinguished
our nation since its founding. . . . The Business Roundtable endorses the Equality
Act and urges that it be enacted by Congress without delay.
Id.
271 The Equality Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/the-equali
ty-act (last updated Mar. 20, 2019). The Equality Act would give protection from discrimina-
tion with regards to employment, housing, credit, education, public spaces and services, feder-
ally funded programs, and jury service. Id.
272 H.B. 1228, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015).
273 See Davis, supra note 8. R
274 ARK. ECON. DEV. COMM’N STRATEGIC PLANNING & RESEARCH DIV., ARKANSAS’S
LARGEST EMPLOYERS — 2015 (2015), https://www.arkansasedc.com/docs/default-source/com-
pare-arkansas/arkansas-largest-employers-2015.pdf.
275 The CEO of Walmart tweeted, “Today’s passage of HB1228 threatens to undermine the
spirit of inclusion present throughout the state of Arkansas and does not reflect the values we
proudly uphold.” Walmart Newsroom (@WalmartNewsroom), TWITTER (Mar. 31, 2015, 3:36
PM), https://twitter.com/WalmartNewsroom/status/583032659787448320.
276 Davis, supra note 8; Laura E. Monteverdi, Ark. Governor Won’t Sign ‘Religious Bill’ R
as is, USA TODAY, (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/
govt-and-business-leaders-object-to-ark-religion-bill/70757942/; Eric Bradner, Arkansas Gov-
ernor Signs Amended ‘Religious Freedom’ Measure, CNN (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.cnn
.com/2015/03/31/politics/arkansas-religious-freedom-anti-lgbt-bill/index.html. In contrast,
Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal decried the “bullying” of elected officials. Bobby Jindal,
Bobby Jindal: I’m Holding Firm Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/bobby-jindal-im-holding-firm-against-gay-marriage
.html.
277 ‘Bathroom Bill’ to Cost North Carolina $3.76 Billion, CNBC (Mar. 27, 2017), https://
www.cnbc.com/2017/03/27/bathroom-bill-to-cost-north-carolina-376-billion.html.
278 Id. In the case of North Carolina’s “bathroom bill,” statewide antidiscrimination pro-
tections excluded gender identity and sexual orientation and mandated transgender people to
use restrooms in public buildings corresponding to the sex on their birth certificates. 2015 N.C.
H.B. 2B (N.C. 2015).
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in 400 jobs.279 Other corporations such as Deutsche Bank and Adidas also
backed out of deals in North Carolina after the bill’s passage.280 Executives
of over 80 corporations signed a public letter urging the governor to repeal
the law.281 “When 80 businesses threaten a single state’s economy, the aggre-
gate negative effect on interstate commerce could be substantial. As such,
Coca-Cola, Disney, and other mega-corporations will continue to hold tre-
mendous power in shaping social policy.”282
Even though North Carolina’s “bathroom bill” was repealed in March
2017 and, under the new law, transgender people were able to use the bath-
room of their choice, challenges remained: there would be no legal recourse
if any person, business, or state entity did not allow transgender people to do
so.283 This situation illustrates that despite the might of corporations to influ-
ence the debate on a particular social movement, it may not end with the
hoped-for outcome. Just as in social movements without corporate participa-
tion, change may be incremental and not as sweeping as movements may
aspire to. On the positive side, however, there was some progress—just not
as much as some of the social movement organizations had worked towards.
In 2016, “legislators in at least twenty-five states . . . proposed more
than a hundred bills limiting [LGBTQ] rights, often under the guise of pro-
tecting religious freedom; North Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi have
passed laws that, in various ways, make anti-L.G.B.T.[Q.] discrimination
legal.”284 America’s biggest corporations struck back. Dow, General Electric,
and Pepsi attacked such a law in Mississippi as “bad for our employees and
bad for business.”285 Disney threatened to halt film production in Georgia in
the event that the governor signed the bill.286 In the end, under the threat of
losing Disney’s business, Georgia’s governor vetoed the religious freedom
279 Jon Kamp & Valerie Bauerlein, PayPal Cancels Plan for Facility in North Carolina,
Citing Transgender Law, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/paypal-
cancels-plans-for-operations-center-400-jobs-over-north-carolinas-transgender-law-14598722
77.
280 ‘Bathroom Bill’ to Cost, supra note 277. R
281 James Surowiecki, Unlikely Alliances, NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/04/25/the-corporate-fight-for-social-justice. Apple, Marriott,
Microsoft, and Pfizer were among the companies that signed the letter. Id.
282 Danielle Weatherby, Corporate America Just Became the LGBT Community’s Most
Powerful Ally, FORTUNE (Apr. 2, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/02/corporate-america-lgbt-
community/.
283 Richard Fausset, Bathroom Law Repeal Leaves Few Pleased in North Carolina, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/north-carolina-senate-acts-to-
repeal-restrictive-bathroom-law.html.
284 Surowiecki, supra note 281. R
285 Allen Smith, Mississippi ‘Religious Freedom’ Law Worries Businesses, SHRM (Apr. 8,
2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/
pages/mississippi-religious-freedom-law.aspx.
286 Daniel Miller, Disney threatens to stop filming in Georgia if anti-gay bill becomes law,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-
disney-georgia-anti-gay-20160323-story.html.
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bill.287 This type of action is not wholly unprecedented. During the civil
rights movement in the 1960s, local businesses encouraged moderation in
the face of local administrators’ resistance to desegregation and suppression
of protests.288 “Today’s fight is driven by national companies, and they’re in
the vanguard: there is no federal law protecting L.G.B.T.[Q.] people from
discrimination, but three-quarters of Fortune 500 firms have policies forbid-
ding it.”289
In the case of LGBTQ rights, exerting corporate pressure on state gov-
ernors appears to have been an effective tactic to accomplish the goals of
this particular social movement.290 “Now, corporations are standing in the
shoes of the consumer activists as ‘super-consumers’ to state economies.”291
In monetary terms, the influence of corporations on state economies is sig-
nificantly greater than the aggregate of socially-conscious consumers.292
Corporations’ involvement in LGBTQ issues, like the immigration
rights movement discussed in section II.A above, are not entirely selfless.
There are business reasons underlying why corporations choose to be at the
forefront of such issues. “Businesses are becoming increasingly invested in
LGBT[Q] rights and diversifying their workforce because . . . ‘their com-
petitive edge depends on it.’” 293 In the case of LGBTQ issues, corporations
want to be viewed as welcoming environments to everyone regardless of
age, gender, race, or sexual orientation.294 Corporations are motivated to at-
tract the best possible person for the job and that means transcending im-
plicit biases against anyone who might be older, female, non-white, or
identifies as a member of the LGBTQ community.295 “[M]ultinational com-
287 Surowiecki, supra note 281. Politicians are not thrilled with corporations’ involvement. R
As an example, Georgia State Senator Josh McKoon complained that Marc Benioff, the CEO
of Salesforce, is “the ringleader for big-business CEOs . . . who use economic threats to
exercise more power over public policy and the voters who use the democratic process.”
Monica Langley, Salesforce’s Marc Benioff Has Kicked Off New Era of Corporate Social
Activism, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/salesforces-marc-benioff-
has-kicked-off-new-era-of-corporate-social-activism-1462201172.
288 Surowiecki, supra note 281. R
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Weatherby, supra note 282. R
292 Id.
293 Marcie Bianco, The Simple Reason so Many US Businesses Openly Support LGBT
Rights, QUARTZ (June 26, 2016), https://qz.com/710643/the-business-sense-of-supporting-lgbt-
rights/.
294 See, for example, lists of best companies to work for if you are a member of the
LGBTQ community. Jacquelyn Smith, The 25 Best Companies For LGBT Employees, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/best-companies-for-lgbt-employees-
2014-3; Corey Barger, These Companies Promote Gay-Friendly Ideals, RANKER, https://www
.ranker.com/list/gay-friendly-companies/coreybarger (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). There are also
corporate equality indexes. See Corporate Equality Index, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://
www.hrc.org/campaigns/corporate-equality-index (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
295 This certainly does not mean that corporations do not exhibit implicit biases. See, e.g.,
Jennifer S. Fan, Innovating Inclusion: The Impact of Women on Private Company Boards, 46
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345 (2019) (illustrating the implicit biases against women in the venture
capital world); Grace Donnelly, Study: Just the Perception of Implicit Bias Takes a Toll on
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panies hold unique and powerful leverage when it comes to advocating [for]
civil rights because states and countries want their business . . . . Companies
must impress . . . that ‘legal certainty for companies and human rights for
citizens go hand in hand.’” 296
The frame projected in the LGBTQ rights movement was to recognize
and respect the rights of members of the LGBTQ community; the goal of the
movement was to ensure that they enjoyed the same rights and privileges as
anyone else. The frame participants we discussed originated from social
movement organizations and social movement organization fields. From the
social movement organization field standpoint, corporations were at the
forefront of the LGBTQ rights movement as was the case with the Muslim
Ban. However, unlike the Muslim Ban, the corporations who participated in
the LGBTQ rights movements came from many different industries and in
greater numbers. As discussed above, corporations helped to create a new
norm in society by being the first to provide health care coverage to the
partners of LGBTQ employees—this was long before laws were passed re-
garding domestic partnerships and same-sex marriage. The lawyers who
framed the movement were successful in creating a cultural shift that laid the
groundwork for many of the successes of the LGBTQ rights movement.
They also had elite allies in the form of corporations who worked alongside
the movement lawyers to spur changes in the law. Corporations also used
economic levers to encourage states to act in a certain way. For example, by
refusing to do business in states that intended to pass laws that discriminated
against members of the LGBTQ community or by pulling out of existing
business relationships, corporations dissuaded states from implementing dis-
criminatory laws, such as the religious freedom laws, which would have had
pernicious effects on the LGBTQ community. Important court victories also
helped to cement LGBTQ rights. Out of the three social movements dis-
cussed, one of the reasons the LGBTQ rights movement was the most suc-
cessful was because its strategy not only mobilized corporate resources at an
early stage but sustained and grew such resources as the movement matured.
Although many corporations support the LGBTQ rights movement,
there are also those that oppose it. One such example is the fast food chain,
Chick-fil-A, Inc. (Chick-fil-A), a family-owned business, founded by S.
Truett Cathy.297 Its corporate purpose reads: “To glorify God by being a
faithful steward of all that is entrusted to us and to have a positive influence
Companies, FORTUNE (July 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/07/13/implicit-bias-perception-
costs-companies/; Lisa Mundy, Why Is Silicon Valley So Awful to Women?, ATLANTIC (Apr.
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/why-is-silicon-valley-so-awful-
to-women/517788/.
296 Aimee Hansen, LGBTQ Rights: Why Companies are Leading the Charge, GLASS HAM-
MER (June 19, 2017), http://theglasshammer.com/2017/06/19/lgbtq-rights-companies-leading-
charge/.
297 History, CHICK-FIL-A, https://www.chick-fil-a.com/About/History (last visited Feb. 2,
2019).
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on all who come into contact with Chick-fil-A.”298 Chick-fil-A’s founders
have a charitable foundation, WinShape Foundation, which is funded by
their fortune from Chick-fil-A, frequently partners with Chick-fil-A,299 and
has contributed millions of dollars to anti-gay groups.300 Other more regional
companies also support anti-LGBTQ efforts, but typically they do not make
the news.301 Although the media has reported on the anti-LGBTQ stance of
Chick-fil-A, it does not seem to have negatively impacted its business in any
sustained way.302 Hobby Lobby is another example of a corporation which
subscribes to anti-LGBTQ views. In one particular case, Hobby Lobby re-
fused to allow a transgender employee to use the women’s restroom in one
of its Illinois stores.303 Eventually, a state administrative law judge found in
the employee’s favor because Hobby Lobby violated the Illinois Human
Rights Act.304 Popular sports apparel brand Under Armour, Inc. (Under Ar-
mour), has also come under fire for its ties to anti-LGBTQ-related
incidents.305
III. NORMATIVE CONCERNS, REASONS FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF
CORPORATIONS, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES
As illustrated in the case studies above, corporations can influence the
trajectory and momentum of social movements. Likewise, social movements
can impact the behavior of corporations.306 Part I examined how court cases
298 Who We Are, CHICK-FIL-A, https://www.chick-fil-a.com/About/Who-We-Are (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2019) (noting that the company is closed on Sundays).
299 See, e.g., Be Our Guest, WINSHAPE FOUNDATION, https://winshape.org/be-our-guest/
(last visited Mar. 8, 2019) (“We are excited to offer these transformational opportunities [Win-
Shape Marriage and WinShape Team retreats] to our friends at Chick-fil-A.”); About Win-
Shape Camps, WINSHAPE CAMPS, https://camps.winshape.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2019) (“WinShape Camps partners with Chick-fil-As around the country to bring camp to
their communities.”).
300 David W. Miller, Chick-fil-A and the Question of Faith in Business, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Aug. 9, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/08/chick-fil-a-and-the-question-o (noting that the Win-
Shape Foundation supports groups that advocate for marriage only between a man and a wo-
man and ex-gay conversions).
301 See Katherine Peralta, Updated List: Who Has Come Out Against, in Favor of NC’s
House Bill 2, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 19, 2016), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/
news/business/article72407477.html (listing businesses that came out for and against HB 2).
302 See Alicia Kelso, Chick-fil-A’s Growth Fueled By Demand For Simplicity, FORBES
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciakelso/2018/04/03/chick-fil-as-growth-trajec
tory-fueled-by-demand-for-simplicity/#399fb94f5612 (noting that Chick-fil-A is “on a stag-
gering growth course to become the third-largest quick-service restaurant in the country”).
303 Sommerville v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm’n Rep. 2011CN2993,
2011CN2994 (May 15, 2015).
304 Id.
305 As an example, Under Armour continued to do business with “Buck Commander,” a
Duck Dynasty spin-off, even after homophobic remarks were made by one of the members of
the series; A&E Networks, in contrast, put that particular cast member on hiatus indefinitely.
Steve Charing, Under Armour Staying with ‘Duck Dynasty’, WASHINGTON BLADE (Dec. 23,
2013), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2013/12/23/armour-staying-duck-dynasty/.
306 “Recent research demonstrates that social movements are capable of influencing cor-
porate behavior, ranging from curbing harmful toxic emissions to granting employees same-
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\9-2\HLB203.txt unknown Seq: 45 16-DEC-19 10:53
2019] Woke Capital: The Role of Corporations in Social Movements 485
and changing norms about the role of corporations led to the modern busi-
ness corporation. The increasing influence of corporations laid the founda-
tion for corporations’ involvement in social movements. Part II demonstrated
the role and impact corporations can have on social movements using three
case studies. This Part discusses the varying impact of corporations and the
various strategies, both legal and nonlegal, that corporations employ when
they are involved in particular social movements. Part III discusses the nor-
mative concerns of the involvement of corporations in social movements and
the underlying reasons they get involved. It then develops guiding principles
on what corporations should consider before participating in such move-
ments. Ultimately, this Part of the Article shows how corporations can en-
hance the legitimacy of social movements using not only legal tactics, but
financial ones, and produce desired outcomes within a new normative frame-
work. The aim of this Part is a modest one—it is intended to start a dialogue
about the role of corporations in social movements; it does not provide an




Through direct advocacy, financial contributions to certain causes or
candidates, lobbying, and political advertising, corporations exert their polit-
ical influence.307 More covertly, corporations “often fund advocacy groups,
trade organizations, or think tanks that work to curry public support using a
variety of techniques, from direct-mail campaigns to expert commentary on
popular television programs.”308 It is the covert nature of corporations’ sup-
port which could argue against corporations helping to shape social move-
ments.309 For example, a fast food company could form a nonprofit that has
an anti-immigrant platform.310
sex domestic partnership benefits to divesting from politically risky countries . . . .” Mary-
Hunter McDonnell, Brayden G King & Sarah A. Soule, A Dynamic Process Model of Private
Politics: Activist Targeting and Corporate Receptivity to Social Challenges, 83 AM. SOC. REV.
654 (2015), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0003122415581335.
307 Wendy L. Hansen & Neil J. Mitchell, Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Politi-
cal Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
891 (2000) (examining a range of corporate political activities).
308 Siebecker, supra note 51, at 177. Corporations may even use nonprofit groups to gain R
access to international officials. See Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV.
201, 204 (2017).
309 Brayden King and Klaus Weber describe two more covert practices of corporate activ-
ism: “astroturfing” and “public deliberators.” King & Weber, supra note 102. Astroturfing is R
the attempt by corporations to replicate grassroots-type movements, while public deliberators
are paid by corporations to go into communities and start conversations about things that
matter to them—which are then relayed to the corporate sponsors. Id.
310 This is sometimes referred to as “dark money.” See, e.g., Jack Gillum, Chad Day &
Stephen Braun, Shadowy Companies, Big Bucks: Election Mystery Money Returns, BUS. IN-
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There are a few arguments that could be used to counter this particular
concern of lack of transparency. First, the information is not covert if it is
publicly accessible. In the case of the example given above, someone could
obtain the tax filings of the nonprofit corporation to determine which corpo-
rations contributed to it. If the individual were so inclined, they could make
the information public by reaching out to the media or watchdog groups that
could disseminate the corporation’s involvement more broadly.
Second, if the nonprofit corporation was properly formed and the for-
profit corporation which funds it followed proper protocol (that is, obtained
necessary consent), the for-profit corporation is acting within the confines of
corporate law. The fact that the for-profit corporation funded the nonprofit
without fanfare does not make its actions illegal.
2. Too Much Power
Some believe that corporations have too much power.311 In fact, in a
2012 survey, eighty-three percent of all Americans believed too much politi-
cal power and influence was concentrated in the hands of corporations and
corporate CEOs.312 One could argue that if corporations were more promi-
nent in social movements, the aims of such movements might be negatively
impacted by corporate influence.
One rebuttal to this concern is that while some corporations have done
bad things with increased power, many have done a lot of good. Corpora-
tions, together with social movements, have wrought significant changes
with broad implications for our society. They are far more nimble than gov-
ernment institutions and this flexibility gives corporations the ability to
quickly revise their policies to meet a movement’s demand. As an example,
“many Fortune 500 firms supported LGBT[Q] issues long before state or
federal governments did, and Fortune 500 firms have been more progressive
on specific LGBT[Q] issues than the majority of the American public.”313
This support of LGBTQ rights most likely originated from the relationship
between the LGBTQ rights movement and corporations.314 As the relation-
SIDER (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-shadowy-companies-big-bucks-
election-mystery-money-returns-2016-2; Paul Blumenthal, Dark Money Groups Are Funded
By Dark Money Groups That Fund Dark Money Groups That Fund. . ., HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 9, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/09/dark-money-
networks_n_4234206.html.
311 Liz Kennedy, Corporate Capture Threatens Democratic Government, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2017/
03/29/429442/corporate-capture-threatens-democratic-government/ (discussing the dangers of
“corporate capture of government”).
312 Id.
313 Brayden King, It’s Time to Study how Corporate Targets Influence Activists, MOBILIZ-
ING IDEAS (July 6, 2015), https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2015/07/06/its-time-to-study-
how-corporate-targets-influence-activists/.
314 Id.
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ship between the two deepened, each one likely influenced the other, espe-
cially given the need of social movements for resources.315
Furthermore, when challenged by activists and forced into action as in
the gun control case study above, corporations adopt social management de-
vices, such as particular structures or practices, to help them maintain their
public image.316 By adopting such social management devices, a corporation
becomes increasingly receptive to future activist claims.317 Therefore, the po-
litical opportunities that grow out of a social movement’s political environ-
ment are dynamic and evolve over time as activist challenges change.318
While social movements shape corporate law by spurring corporations
to act in a way that helps the goals of the movement, there is also a flip side.
Activists who develop relationships with the corporations they intend to in-
fluence are not immune from the corporations’ influence.319 In fact, some of
the corporations may hire such activists or seek their counsel when dealing
with similar issues in the future.320 Partnering “with a former target is a form
of success inasmuch as it indicates that they now have a seat at the table with
a powerful player. The willingness of corporate executives to engage with
activists is a form of inclusion that activists rarely receive in government
institutions.”321 Corporations’ continued involvement in social movements is
thus necessary both for the good of the corporations and for accomplishing
the goals of the social movements themselves.
In addition, corporate involvement may come with increased resources.
As corporations play a more prominent role in social movements, they can
provide the necessary resources. This, in turn, helps to facilitate public sup-
port to both build momentum and help sustain it (but not always) as the
particular movement evolves.322 Resources can take many forms.323 “This
includes, most generally, people and money, and some degree of legitimacy
within one or more sets of relevant actors, such as the movement’s constitu-
ency or the larger public.”324 In the case of corporations, as Part II illustrates,
the resources corporations bring to bear on social movements are legal, eco-
nomic, social (for example, reputational and cultural), and political. On the
legal front, corporations have deployed their in-house lawyers to file amicus
315 “Social movements are . . . highly dependent on resources for mobilizing collective
action and change. How movements evolve certainly depends on where those resources come
from.” Id.
316 McDonnell et al., supra note 306, at 671. R
317 Id. at 654.
318 Id. at 655.
319 Id. at 674.
320 King, supra note 313. R
321 Id.
322 In the mid-1970s, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald developed the premise of resource
mobilization where the emergence and sustenance of social movement activity depended on
the amount of resources available to channel into movement mobilization and activity. SNOW
& SOULE, supra note 60, at 87–88. R
323 Id. at 88.
324 Id. at 89.
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briefs. From an economic perspective, corporations have used economic
levers to persuade other organizations or local or state governments to act in
a particular way. On the social front, corporations use their reputational capi-
tal and impact on norms in social movements. For example, corporations
have used the media to make particular issues more salient in the public
consciousness. Corporations can also lay the groundwork for a new norm by
implementing changes in social norms that social movements aspire to
within the corporation itself.325 Lastly, corporations can influence the politi-
cal climate through lobbying or other means.
Even with its broad reach, the power of corporations is not limitless.
And, it is certainly not limitless in the context of social movements. Corpo-
rate influence can be checked through regulatory reform. The question is to
what extent we want to encourage such influence or obstruct or neutralize its
effects. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) which oversees Employee
Retirement Income Security Act-covered (ERISA) employee benefit plans
provides one such example of regulatory reform. As a general matter, ER-
ISA requires that plan fiduciaries, who manage a plan’s investments, act with
the “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” that an individual familiar with
such matters would exercise.326 The regulatory guidance released by the
DOL in April 2018 provides more details on this general rule and recom-
mends that a fiduciary have a documented cost-benefit analysis before incur-
ring significant costs in an environmental, social, or corporate governance
(ESG) related issue. The DOL is “clarifying” that when fiduciaries make
investment decisions, they cannot make such decisions at the expense of
returns nor can they assume greater risks so that they can promote collateral
ESG policy goals.327 The DOL went on to state that “fiduciaries must not too
readily treat ESG factors as  economically relevant to the particular invest-
ment choices”328 and that “the IB was not meant to imply that plan fiducia-
ries, including appointed investment managers, should routinely incur
significant plan expenses to, for example, fund advocacy, press, or mailing
campaigns on shareholder resolutions, call special shareholder meetings, or
initiate or actively sponsor proxy fights on environmental or social is-
sues.”329 Therefore, corporations (such as BlackRock), which focus on ESG
issues, will need to rethink how they can comply with the law while fulfil-
ling their ESG goals.
This recent development with the DOL is not favorable for corporations
who want to actively participate in social issues. However, it demonstrates
how the government can blunt the actions of corporations in social move-
ments by re-characterizing what a corporation can or cannot do. Constraints
325 See, e.g., Fan, infra note 344.
326 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2018).
327 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO. 2018-01 (2018).
328 Id.
329 Id. “IB” refers to Interpretive Bulletin 2016-01, issued by the Department of Labor to
“assist plan fiduciaries in understanding their obligations under ERISA.” Id.
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may also be placed on corporations in their participation in social move-
ments due to their own internal limitations and changing public opinion. For
example, with respect to the Muslim Ban, high technology companies were
visible at the beginning, but their support waned as the movement continued.
We can only speculate as to why this is the case. Perhaps it is because their
attention moved on to other more pressing matters. Or maybe their de-
creased action reflected decreasing public interest. Whatever the answer is,
the fact remains that even with the help of corporations, activists were not
successful in overturning the Muslim Ban.
3. Self-Interested and Not Agents of Change
At their core, social movements are meant to challenge the status quo.
“The strategy of social or societal transformation calls for tactics that bring
into sharp focus the inequities and injustices of social structures and arrange-
ments or various social practices, such as discrimination against a particular
community”330 (for example, immigrants or members of the LGBTQ com-
munity). In contrast, one could argue that corporations are often not seen as
agents of change and will only act when they have a self-interest.331
While this is a legitimate concern, one response is that, to a certain
extent, simply because corporations are not agents of change does not mean
that they cannot help a movement in some fashion. For example, e-mail and
tweets help to rapidly disseminate information. When a tweet comes from
the CEO of a well-known corporation the message becomes even more
widespread. Indeed, the external environment plays a critical role in both
330 SNOW & SOULE, supra note 60, at 168 (emphasis in original). R
331 Some companies could be using support of social movements as a calculated market-
ing move. Consider, for example, the differing opinions on whether Nike and the ad campaign
it ran with Colin Kaepernick were intended to support the movement or just cause conversa-
tion. Stephen Bainbridge categorizes this campaign under the growing efforts by “social jus-
tice warrior [(SJW)] CEOs” to align themselves with “woke coastal millennials.” Bainbridge
thinks that the campaign could simply reflect the more inherently liberal values of corporate
officers, as the “values, beliefs, and tastes of social justice warrior CEOs like [former Nike
CEO] Phil Knight have radically diverged from those of red state populists. In many cases, it
simply would not occur to SJWs like Knight that there are folks who would take offense from
the Kaepernick ad.” Stephen Bainbridge, Woke Business: Putting the Nike-Kaepernick Ad
Controversy into Context: The Problem of Social Justice Warrior CEOs, PROFESSORBAIN-
BRIDGE.COM (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2018/09/woke-business-putting-the-nike-kaepernick-ad-controversy-into-context-the-problem-
of-social-justice-.html. However, Ann Lipton has some reservations about this assertion, find-
ing it “difficult to believe that Knight was unaware this is a controversial move; it seems
designed to be controversial.” Ann Lipton, The Revolution Will Be Marketed, BUSINESS LAW
PROF BLOG (Sept. 8, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2018/09/the-
revolution-will-be-marketed.html. Indeed, if stock prices and earnings are any indication, Nike
posted a slightly better than predicted quarter despite any blowback from the campaign. Kevin
Kelleher, Don’t Blame Kaepernick, But Nike Stock Dropped 4% After Its Earning Report Was
Released, FORTUNE (Sept. 25, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/09/25/nike-stock-today-earnings-
report-colin-kaepernick-ad-campaign/. Whether intended or not, Nike’s campaign has effec-
tively commodified dissent.
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mobilization and opportunities for success of a given social movement.332
This connection has been coined the “political opportunity structure.”333 In
particular, it points to the importance of cultivating elite allies (such as cor-
porations) who can influence social issues through communication channels
or funding, among other things.334
Changing the social norms referred to by Professors Eisenberg, Rock,
and Wachter in Part I above, involves trust.335 Therefore, the actions a corpo-
ration undertakes in the name of a social movement can be checked because
it must resonate with key stakeholders as well as adhere to the corporation’s
strategic plan, mission, and values.336
The normative concerns outlined above are valid and should not be
overlooked. On the positive side, however, corporations can: (1) increase
public attention on particular social issues when the corporation’s CEO is-
sues a statement, tweet, or other form of communication; (2) provide fund-
ing to the social movement organization which supports the relevant social
movement (or, conversely, take away funding from an organization that is at
odds with a particular social movement); (3) provide economic incentives to,
or withdraw economic support from, state and local governments which pro-
pose to pass laws that will harm the beneficiaries of a particular social move-
ment; and (4) implement policies in the corporation itself—even if it is not
required by law—to help accomplish the goals of the social movement (for
example, offering domestic partnership benefits before it was required by
law).
In short, corporations appear to be most effective when they are en-
gaged in a combination of overt and covert actions: pulling advertising dol-
lars, providing or taking away economic incentives, funding nonprofit
organizations which engage in the grassroots work necessary to sustain a
particular social movement, bringing public attention to issues borne out of
the social movement through its extensive access to the media, and having a
large enough number of corporations across many different industries who
have a continued commitment to the social movement. However, they may
hinder social movements by not coordinating their efforts with others in the
movement and by not having a sustained commitment, as was the case with
the Muslim Ban. Also, corporations may not have the ability to garner the
support of those outside of their respective industries; this is where social
movement organizations play a particularly important role because they are
likely working with social movement organization fields across the spectrum
and are not focused on corporations in only one type of industry. They can
help to build coalitions to advance the causes of the social movement.
332 SNOW & SOULE, supra note 60, at 222. R
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 See discussion supra notes 58–59.
336 Don Mayer, The Law and Ethics of CEO Social Activism, 23 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 21, 24
(2017).
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B. Reasons Why Corporations Get Involved with Social Movements
Constraints may be placed on corporations in their participation in so-
cial movements due to their own internal limitations and public perception.
However, there are circumstances under which corporations may want or
need to step into the fray for business, public perception, or other reasons.
1. Moral Authority and Leadership
First, certain corporations may have the moral authority to speak out on
a particular issue because their commitment to it may be well-established or
they are known to act for what is right based on values that the corporation
itself may subscribe to.337
Indeed, some corporations have denied that their sociopolitical posi-
tions are economically motivated; instead, they are value-based pursuant to
their mission statement. Apple CEO Tim Cook and former Starbucks CEO
Howard Schultz provide illustrative examples.338 In fact, they went so far as
to say “that shareholders were welcome to sell their shares of stock if they
disagreed with the company’s sociopolitical positions.”339 Cook also stated
that, “business is just a collection of people, and if people have values, than
[sic] a business should, too.”340 These types of corporations have the oppor-
tunity to showcase their leadership skills in times of social movements.
2. Responding to Boycotts
Corporations may also find themselves involved in social movements
because their products or services are boycotted as described in Part I above.
They can respond to such boycotts by building an infrastructure within the
corporation itself to respond to not only the issue born out of the immediate
social concern, but any future issues that may arise.341
337 See discussion supra notes 145–155. R
338 Nalick et al., supra note 9. R
339 Id. “The CEO of Salesforce.com has also spoken with candor on the stands his com-
pany has taken on sociopolitical issues such as gay marriage, race, and the Confederate flag,
even though these issues appear to be largely unrelated to the company’s operations.” Id.
340 Alan Murray & David Meyer, Trump’s Trade Fallout, Tech Hit, China Bear Market:
CEO Daily for June 26, 2018, FORTUNE (June 26, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/06/26/trump-
trade-fallout-tech-china-bear-ceo-daily-for-june-26-2018/. This statement was made in re-
sponse to the Trump Administration’s policy of separating immigrant children from parents at
the border. “You are never going to fulfill your mission of changing the world by” staying
quiet and focusing on issues that directly affect the bottom line. Id.
341 Facebook recently announced that it will link employee bonuses to “making progress
on major social issues,” rather than growth. Hannah Murphy, Facebook to Link Employee
Bonuses to Progress on Social Issues, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/
145a87ea-29ce-11e9-a5ab-ff8ef2b976c7. The issues to be addressed include the spread of fake
news, data privacy and security, and “building new experiences that . . . improve people’s
lives.” Id. While this seems praiseworthy, the social issues to be addressed are ones that have
been the center of recent scandals at Facebook. See id.
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Professor Sarah Soule, who studies organizational management, found
that one of the more frequent responses to boycotts by corporations is to
establish a corporate social responsibility board committee.342 “These com-
mittees usually include nonprofit and civil society representatives that im-
prove the company’s capacity to engage with activists, reduce the likelihood
that future grievances will threaten the company’s reputation, and strengthen
the company’s ability to recognize and respond to emerging problems in
ways that pacify activist stakeholders.”343
3. Responding to Proxy Proposals
An additional way that social issues are brought to the attention of a
corporation’s management are proxy proposals.344 “Proxy proposals can be
used by shareholders to bring a wide range of social issues to the attention of
a company’s management.” Many social movement organizations engage in
this form of “internal” activism where they “operate activist investing units,
buying stakes in a company so that they will be able to submit a proxy
proposal to draw attention to the issues they care about.”345
According to one research study, many corporations implement corpo-
rate social research reports in response to proxy proposals.346 By doing so,
corporations “can help alleviate investor uncertainty about a firm’s social
and environmental behavior by more proactively communicating the com-
pany’s perspective.”347
C. Guiding Principles for Corporations Involved in Social Movements
Based on the three case studies in Part II above, there appears to be an
unspoken understanding that corporations will continue to be a part of social
movements. In part, this is due to the resources corporations can provide and
their ability to facilitate outcomes given their prominent role in our society.
Corporations themselves may be motivated to participate in social move-
342 Dale T. Miller, Sarah Soule: How Activism Can Fuel Corporate Social Responsibility,
STAN. BUS.: INSIGHTS (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/sarah-soule-how-
activism-can-fuel-corporate-social-responsibility. “Boycotts are a familiar, high-profile ‘exter-
nal’ form of activism, which often results from a breakdown in the [corporation]’s ability to
manage contentious stakeholders and social issues. . . . [B]oycotts generate negative media
attention and threaten the reputation of the targeted companies . . .” Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2019) (dealing with proxy proposals); Jennifer S.
Fan, Employees as Regulators: The New Private Ordering in High Technology Companies,
2019 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the impact of employees on private order-
ing in high technology companies).
345 Miller, supra note 342. “In more adversarial cases, shareholder resolutions can be pub- R
licized as a way to generate media attention and galvanize public pressure to get social con-
cerns on the corporate agenda.” Id.
346 Id.
347 Id.
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ments because it behooves them to do so. For example, a significant number
of their employees may be immigrants, as was the case in the Muslim Ban.
At other times, however, they will not respond at all and choose to weather
the public outcry. In other cases, corporations will be forced into action as
was the case with the gun control movement. The varying responses of cor-
porations depend on a few different factors: (1) the composition of their
workforce (for example, if they have a lot of millennials who tend to be
more vocal); (2) whether they have a self-interest in the movement; (3)
whether it aligns with their corporate values; and (4) whether there are busi-
ness reasons to get involved. Some or all of these factors can be found in the
different legal theories of the nature and purpose of the corporation dis-
cussed in Part I.
In most cases, corporations do not consider how their action or inaction
may affect the particular social movement or how their actions can influence
existing norms or create new ones. Instead, their conception of norms devel-
ops and matures over time at the behest of employees or other stakeholders.
The aim of this section was to offer a few preliminary guiding princi-
ples to help corporations rethink their roles in social movements. First, cor-
porations should consider whether their participation is expected and
necessary due to their stakeholders. For example, in the case of the LGBTQ
movement, corporations were at the forefront of developing workplace poli-
cies that included issues unique to the LGBTQ community, such as domestic
partner policies, prior to it being required by law. Corporations undertook
the initiative at the behest of their LGBTQ employees.
Second, corporations should evaluate the basis of their commitment to
the particular social movement and determine whether the goals of the par-
ticular movement fit within their corporate purpose. In light of the broad
nature of the corporate purpose of many corporations, it will most likely be
the case that if a corporation is inclined to lend its support to a social move-
ment the corporate purpose should not pose a barrier.
Third, corporations need to determine whether collaborations with other
organizations, such as nonprofit organizations or other corporations, may be
helpful in achieving a particular outcome. For example, collaborating with
other corporations to prepare amicus briefs could be one way to leverage the
collective influence of corporations.
Fourth, corporations need to determine how they will use their legal,
political, economic, and social clout in a particular social movement. How
they utilize such resources will largely depend on the movement itself and
the business implications for the corporation itself.
The suggestions outlined above are not comprehensive. They are a
starting point for what I hope will be a larger discussion on the role of corpo-
rations on the vexing and pressing social issues that we face today.
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CONCLUSION
In a day and age where one tweet or social media post can go viral and
make or break the reputation of a corporation seemingly overnight, corpora-
tions find themselves in the unenviable position of how to respond to some-
times controversial issues. Where quick responsiveness has become the
norm, a single misstep or misreading of public sentiment can result in conse-
quences worth billions of dollars. Corporations must carefully evaluate how
to respond to issues over which they have little to no control. In no case is
this made more abundantly clear than with respect to social movements. In
the past, corporations generally did not take a position on pressing social
issues unless forced by economic pressures to do so. Today, however, quite
the opposite is true. Corporations are expected to take a stance; to do other-
wise is at their peril.
The debate about the role of corporations in our society continues un-
abated. Court cases and changing norms about the role of the corporation in
society led to the development of the modern business corporation. Econom-
ics, values, stakeholders, media, and morality led to the involvement of cor-
porations in social movements. By analyzing corporations through the lens
of social movements, we place them within a larger epistemological frame-
work thereby deepening our understanding of corporations as an agent of
change and the effect of social movements upon them.
